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BECAUSE CALIFORNIA HAS SOME OF THE MOST INTRICATE AND CONTRO-
VERSIAL LAND USE LAWS IN THE COUNTRY, MY COLLEAGUES AND I WANT TO 
SEE HOW FAR THESE CASES REALLY GO. PRIVATE PROPERTY RIGHTS NEED 
PROTECTION FROM REGULATIONS THAT GO TOO FAR. BUT WE ALSO NEED TO 
SEE IF LOCAL OFFICIALS CAN STILL USE LAND USE REGULATIONS TO 
PROTECT THE PUBLIC'S SAFETY AND WELL-BEING. 
LANDOWNERS AND PUBLIC OFFICIALS NEED TO RE-EXAMINE THEIR 
RESPONSIBILITIES IN LIGHT OF THESE CASES. AND THE LEGISLATURE 
HAS A CLEAR DUTY TO HELP SORT OUT THESE ISSUES. LEGISLATORS NEED 
TO UNDERSTAND IF THESE CASES ARE THE END OF A REGULATORY ERA OR 
JUST NARROW LEGAL INTERPRETATIONS. I WANT THIS TO BE A FORUM 
WHERE EVERYONE CAN GET THE ANSWERS THEY NEED. 
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and it cast no doubt on the use of subdivision exactions and 
dedication requirements so long as there exists a causal relation 
between the problem created and the exaction demanded. 
In a series of recent cases involving business regulation, 
most of them decided unanimously, the Court has sustained 
legislation that is very costly to property owners, is 
retroactive in its application, invalidates contractual 
arrangements, and plainly disappoints well-established economic 
expectations. These uncontroversial cases signal that the Court 
has no inclination to challenge the extensive regulatory schemes 
in effect in a wide swath of areas such as pension benefits, home 
ownership, employee medical coverage, water pollution control, 
nuclear industry liability, social security and pesticide 
regulation. 
This is not as surpr1s1ng as it might at first seem. In an 
economy like ours, where the assumption, virtually across the 
political spectrum, is that government has a role to play in 
dealing with issues like unemployment, interest rates, money 
supply, labor-management disputes, toxic wastes, and so on, a 
substantial amount of public involvement in shaping and 
management of the economy is inescapable. And that means a good 
deal of law that changes the rules of the game and affects the 
value of property. It is not easy to imagine even the most 
property-oriented Court holding regulation of taxies, limiting 
compensation for a nuclear accident, or regulating pension 
benefits, unconstitutional. So long as government is a major 
player in the management of the economy, judicially-imposed 
constitutional limits on property regulation are destined to be 
marginal matters. No revolution in property is on the horizon. 
How then explain the results in Nollan and First Lutheran 
Church? The Court saw Nollan as a coerced contr a 
public easement,- government " which the Court has 
condemned. It did not see the case as a conventional 
subdivision dedication of roads or parklands, where the 
contribution is meant to remedy a problem the development itself 
has created. 
First Lutheran Church does s icant change the rules 
of property/taking law, by imposing the economic burden of 
unconstitutional regulation on the government, rather than the 
landowner, for the period during which constitutionality is being 
litigated. But since not many regulations are found 
unconstitutional, its practical,impact is likely to be slight. 
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STATEMENT OF 
PROFESSOR JOSEPH L. SAX 
BOALT HALL (LAW SCHOOL) 
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA (BERKELEY) 
before the 
California Legislature 
Senate Committee 
on 
Local Government 
Special Hearing 
THE LIMITS OF LAND USE REGULATION 
August 13, 1987 
To help understand the significance of the U.S. Supreme 
Court's recent decisions in Nollan v. California Coastal 
Commission! and First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of 
Glendale v. County of Los Angeles2, some background on the modern 
history of property cases in the Court may be useful to you. 
Because I am the first witness today, I shall, before providing 
that background, briefly summarize the Nollan and First Lutheran 
Church cases. 
A SL~RY OF THE TEMPORARY TAKING CASE (First Lutheran Church) 
the church owned land in a flood 
~~~~~~~~~~~~-
in. Following a destroyed the church's buildings, 
the Coun adopted an ordinance prohibiting reconstruction within 
a designated flood protection area that included First Lutheran 
Church's land. First Lutheran Church claimed that it had been 
denied all use of its property, and that the ordinance therefore 
constituted a ~aking of its proper . It sought just compensation 
measured from the day the ordinance had been adopted. The 
question before the U.S. Supreme Court was not whether such 
regulation did or did not constitute a taking. The Court decided 
only a constitutional question. The issue in the case was 
whether--assuming that the regulation in question constituted a 
taking because it was so restrictive--the church was entitled to 
be compensated for the time the ordinance was in effect, or 
whether it was sufficient for the County to simply withdraw the 
ordinance upon being told by a court that it was invalid. 
The Court held (in a 6-3 decision) that if a land use 
regulation is found to be invalid as a constitutional "taking" of 
property, then "just compensation" must be paid for the period of 
55 U.S. Law Week 5145 (June 26, 1987). 
2 55 U.S. Law Week 4781 (June 9, 1987). 
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the height of a building. 
As the Court put it, " ... unless the permit condition serves 
the same governmental purpose as the development ban, the 
building restriction is not a valid ion of land use but an 
out and out plan of extortion."3 The Court then turned to the 
factual question which underlay its constitutional law rule: Was 
there a nexus of purpose between some problem the Nollan proposal 
would create and the remedy the Commission proposed? The Court 
emphatically denied the presence of any such nexus. It said it 
could not see any relation between a claimed right to view the 
beach that Nollan might block, or a psychological barrier coastal 
homeowners might be imposing by making the beach seem closed to 
the public, and a public easement across the beach. The 
Commission did not seem to the Court to be dealing with the 
problem Nollan was creating; it seemed rather to have seized on 
those problems as an excuse to exact something else it wanted all 
along, a public pathway along the beach above the high tide line. 
NOLLAN AND FIRST LUTHERAN CHURCH IN CONTEXT 
Two questions are raised by Nollan and First Lutheran 
Church: (l) Are these cases the leading edge of a fundamental 
revision, favorable to landowners, of property rights after 
decades of judicial neglect? (2) Will these cases fundamentally 
change the way California local governments, and the Coastal 
Commission, will have to do business? 
No one can an unambiguous answer to these questions. 
But some informed can be made about where the Court is 
go , and how local governments and states should respond. Here 
are the points to which I would call attention. 
Plainly we have a more conservative, proper iented U.S. 
Court than we have had in many decades, and plainly 
is on th~ Court 1 s in a way it' has not been for 
more than half a century. From the 1920's until the last half-
dozen years, we averaged not more than one "taking" cases every 
few years. Since the famous Euc and Nectow2 cases in 1926 and 
1928 the Court had virtually refused to concern itself with local 
land use cases. One can literally count on a single hand the 
zoning-related case that had--until very recently--reached the 
--~·--------
3 
4 
926). 
5 
55 U.S. Law Week, at 5148. 
272 u.s. 365 
277 u.s. 183 (1928). 
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unanimity in the current Court on property than on any other 
constitutional question. Out of nearly 20 recent cases, 12 were 
decided by unanimous votes, and two others were decided 8-1 and 
7-1.9 
As to the permissible subjects of regulation, the Court has 
reiterated recently the propriety of regulation of billboard 
regulation for aesthetic purposes,10 open space zoning, historic 
landmark protection, safeguarding traditional community 
character, strip mine contour restoration, pesticide regulation, 
wetland development restriction and endangered species 
protection. In Nollan, it assumed the validity of protecting 
visual easements, and it cast no doubt on the use of subdivision 
exactions and dedication requirements so long as there exists a 
nexus between the problem creat~d and the exaction demanded. 
It has also reiterated the economic viability test, which 
has always been interpreted to permit very considerable 
diminutions of value. In one modern case after another--Penn 
Central, Goldblatt and Andrus v. Allard--to take but three 
examples, very considerable diminutions of value were held to be 
constitutionally permissible. Moreover, the of the Court 
has this term cited with approval the century-old decision in 
Mugler v. Kansasll~ which is usually understood to permit 
unlimited diminution of value in order to serve a legitimate 
police power purpose. 
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demanded of the owner's premises.l6 This perspective also 
explains the deep split in the Court in the Penn Central case, 
where the minority, led by Justice Rehnquist, insisted that the 
owners were in effect being required to contribute their air 
rights to the public, rather than being prevented from causing 
some harm. 
To anyone who saw the Court's taking cases evolving as I 
have just described them, the Nollan case was not a surprise. 
The only question was whether the Court would buy the Coastal 
Commission's nexus argument, bringing the case within the 
mainstream of subdivision exaction cases. Once it became clear 
they would not, Nollan became a conventional "invasion" case, 
doomed to defeat. 
This reading of Nollan suggests that it is not the leading 
edge of a significant reordering of property rights, but one more 
of the fairly standard "anti-invasion" doctrine cases that are a 
staple of Supreme Court property law. 
There is, to be sure, another possible reading of the case. 
Both Justice Rehnquist in the recent Keystone easel? and Justice 
Scalia in Nollan have intimated that the Court is going to be 
less deferential than it has in the past in accepting state or 
local government justifications for regulation. Obviously Nollan 
itself is an example of such increased judicial scrutiny, for 
Justice Scalia simply would not accept the Coastal Commission's 
assertion that lateral access was a suitable substitute for loss 
of visual access. Such heightened judicial inquiry into an 
essentially factual and judgmental area was one ground for the 
vigorous dissent in that case. 
It would indeed be a dramatic change if the Supreme Court 
began to give detailed scrutiny to the justifiability of various 
state and local land use regulations. I doubt that such a change 
is in the offing. My own reading of the Scalia opinion is that he 
found the Coastal Commission's claim simply unbelievable. He 
thought that if they wanted to protect visual access, they could 
and should have done so directly. He believed, I think, that they 
simply were determined to create a public right-of-way along the 
beach, and had invented visual and psychological access as a 
nexus when challenged. 
Even if I am wrong, and there is an incipient majority that 
believes greater judicial scrutiny is needed, I predict that such 
a position will not last long. Once the Court opens the door to 
16 Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhatten CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 
419 (1982). 
17. 55 U.S. Law Week, at 433 7 (" ... legitimacy of this 
purpose is a question of federal, rather than state, law, subject 
to independent scrutiny by this Court."). 
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COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 
OFFICE OF THE COUNTY COUNSEL 
648 HALL OF ADMINISTRATION 
500 WEST TEMPLE STREET 
LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90012 
DE WITT W. CLINTON, COUNTY COUNSEL 
California Legislature 
Senate Committee on 
Local Government 
August 6, 1987 
Room 2080 State Capitol 
Sacramento, California 95814 
Attention: Kaye Packard, Committee Secretary 
Re: Recent Land Use Opinion of the 
United States Supreme Court 
Dear Senators: 
(213) 974-1845 
On behalf of the County of Los Angeles, we are submitting a 
paper entitled "The First English Evangelical Lutheran Church 
Case: What Did It Actually Decide?" for consideration by the 
Senate Local Government Committee during its review of 
California land use regulations on August 13, 1987. 
By 
CJM/fsl 
Enclosure 
Very 
CHARLES J. MOORE 
Principal Deputy 
County Counsel 
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THE FIRST ENGLISH EVANGELICAL LUTHERhN 
CHURCH CASE: WHAT DID IT ACTUALLY DECIDE? 
BY JACK R. WHITE* 
INTRODUCTION 
On June 9, 1987, the United States Supreme Court 
issued its decision in the case of .:F:-'i""_r_c__s __ t_: __ :c__ ___ ~_l_;__:i;'3]_:1 _ _E:_vang:~_lical 
Lutheran Church of Glendale les. By 
judgment in favor of the County in an inverse condemnation 
action in which the Church claims that its property was 
"taken" without payment of just compensation by a temporary 
County f ood protection zoning ordinance. The decision has 
been described in most news media reports as a "landmark 
decision" and "major victory" for landov1ners which is likely 
to have an enormous t on ocal governments. 
Unfortunately, the media descr ions of the case 
re not a accurate and many we so crypti as to be 
* The author a the Firs lish case on behalf of 
the County of Los Ange es in the United States Supreme 
Court. He is a partner i the Los les law firm of 
Hill, Farrer & Burrill. The firm has represented the 
County in numerous land use and zoning liti ion 
matters, but it also regularly represents private 
property owners and real estate developers in such 
matters. 
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misleading. As a result, a great deal of misinformation has 
been circulated and much confusion and misunderstanding 
prevails as to what the Court actually decided and, equally 
as important, what it did not decide. For example, an 
article about the case appearing in the Los Angeles Herald 
Examiner on June 10, 1987, stated, 
"Zoning laws that restrict landowners' 
use of their property, even temporarily, 
are the equivalent of a 'taking' of private 
land for public use, 'for which the 
Constitution clearly requires 
compensation,' the court said." 
Taken literally, that would mean that compensation is now 
constitutionally required for virtually al~ zoning measures. 
That is not what the Court held. Nor did the Court hold that 
flood protection and other health and safety restrictions on 
land use constitute a taking for which compensation must be 
paid, as some other reports have suggested. 
What the Court did decide was a narrow point of 
constitutional law which now requires the California courts 
to reconsider the Church's inverse condemnation claim, but 
which ultimately should have no effect at all on the result. 
In a nutshell, the Court concluded that the California courts 
had incorrectly interpreted the Constitution when they 
established a rule to the effect that a landowner who claims 
his property has been "taken" by a zoning or other land use 
regulation, may not sue for compensation in inverse 
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condemnation, but must instead seek judicial invalidation of 
the offending Chief Justice Rehnquist and the 
five Justices joined with him disagreed with that rule 
and held that the Fifth and Fourteenth l-\mendments to the 
United States Constitution require that the landowner be 
permitted to sue for damages suffered during the time the 
offending regulation is in effect before it is finally 
determined by the courts to be a "taking.!! This period of 
time during which the offending regulation is in effect 
before it is declared to be a taking, was characterized by 
the Court majority as a Htemporary taking." Hence, 
the case firmly establishes the precedent that damages may 
now be recovered for so-called " rary regulatory 
Before I to ain what I think this 
means, or we engage in any speculation as to what the 
ruling's actual impact may be on zoni policies and 
p actices, I believe it will put ever ng into bett.er 
perspective if we first examine the history of the temporary 
taki issue and see how it came before the Court in 
this particular case. 
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PREVIOUS UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 
DECISIONS CONCERNING REGULATORY TAKINGS 
AND CALIFORNIA'S AGINS RULE. 
(a) Regulatory Takings In General. 
The notion that a land use regulation may 
constitute a "taking" of property within the meaning of the 
Fifth Amendment is, of course, nothing new. Since its 
decision in Pennsylvania Coal Company v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 
(1922), the Supreme Court repeatedly has said that a state 
(or federal) police power regulation of property which "goes 
too far" will be recognized as an unconstitutional "taking" 
of such property.l/ It is equally well-established, however, 
that not every destruction or injury to property by 
governmental action results in a "taking" in the 
constitutional sense.~/ 
--------·---
l/ E.g. MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U.S. 
, 91 L.Ed.2d 285 (1986); Williamson County Reg. 
P an. Comm. v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. , 87 L.Ed.2d 
126 (1985}; Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 
(1979). 
~/ Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 83 
(1980); Andrus v. Allard, 441 U.S. 51, 65 (1979). 
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In numerous deci s preceding the First 
case, the Court ledged that the difficult problem 
always is how to define too far," that is, "to distinguish 
the point at which a regulation becomes so onerous that it 
has the same effect as an ation of the property 
through eminent domain or physica possession " 3 The Court 
further admitted that it has thus far been unable to develop 
any "set formula" for the resolution of this issue. Instead, 
the answer depends largely upon the particular circumstances 
of each case and calls for essentially ~q hoc factual 
inquiries to balance public and private interests. The 
bottom line question has been said to be •.vhether, under all 
of the circumstances, the particular restriction on private 
property forces some people alone to bear public burdens 
which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the 
public as a whole. 
In its 1978 decision in rta-
tion Co. v. New York Ci 438 U.S. 104 (1978), the Court 
identified what it called three relevant considerations" for 
this ad hoc factual inquiry: (a) the !! character of the 
governmental action"i (b) the "economic impact of the 
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regulation on the claimant"; and (c) the "extent to which the 
regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed 
expectations." In subsequent decisions, the Court has 
consistently reiterated what it said in Penn Central and has 
tried to apply those three factors to the particular facts 
and circumstances of the case. 
In Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980), 
the Supreme Court repeated much of what I have said above, 
but also expressed a simplified version of the rule to be 
applied when there is a mere facial attack on a particular 
zoning ordinance - that is, where it is claimed that the mere 
enactment of the ordinance effects a taking of a landowner's 
property. That rule is, "[t]he application of a general 
zoning law to particular property effects a taking if the 
ordinance does not substantially advance legitimate state 
interests or denies an owner economically viable 
use of his land " While the opinion itself does not 
make it entirely clear what the Court meant by 11 economically 
viable use," when the result in that case is considered along 
with other decisions of the Court, most legal commentators 
have interpreted this to mean that substantially all 
economically feasible use must be denied before it can be 
found that there has been a taking. In ~gips, the Court held 
that a zoning ordinance which, on its face, allowed some 
development of the plaintiff's property (at least one single 
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ordinance was a taking. The California Supreme Court held 
that the property owner could not bring an inverse 
condemnation action under such circumstances because 
requiring the local government to pay for the property (if 
the ordinance was held to a taking) would have the effect of 
forcing the local government to exercise its power of eminent 
domain. The California Supreme Court felt that it was 
improper for courts to interfere with the local government's 
prerogative in that fashion. Accordingly, the court held 
that the property owner's remedy for the claimed taking was 
limited to bringing a declaratory relief or mandamus action 
to have the ordinance declared invalid and unenforceable, if 
it amounted to a taking in violation of the Fifth 
Amendment.~/ 
Thus, it is important to note that the California 
Supreme Court did not hold that a public entity may take 
private property by regulatory action and keep it without 
paying for it, as some commentators have suggested. Rather, 
the clear effect of the decision was that if the regulation 
was found to go "too far'' and was declared to be a taking, it 
could not thereafter be enforced unless the public entity 
elected to exercise its power of eminent domain and pay 
~/ Agins v. City of Tiburon (1979) 23 Cal.3d 266, 157 
Cal.Rptr. 372. 
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compensation to the prope owner. 
In ns, the prope owner did also assert a 
claim for declaratory relief, by which he sought to have the 
zoning ordinance declared invalid. Because of the presence 
of that claim, the California Supreme Court went on to 
discuss the merits of the alleged taking. The court rejected 
the claim on the ground that the ordinance merely caused a 
diminution in the value of the property, at the most, and did 
not amount to a taking. 
As mentioned previously, when the case reached the 
United States Supreme Court on appeal, that Court agreed with 
the California Supreme Court that no taking had been 
adequately all because the ordinance, on its face, showed 
that some development of the property was permissible. The 
Court also observed that because the prope owner had not 
s any devel 
the ultimate economic 
permit, it was impossible to know what 
t of the ordinance on the property 
owner would be. In any event, since it agreed t~ere was no 
regulatory taking/ the reme Court sa d t was unnecessary 
to consider whether the California reme Court's holding 
limiting the remedy for a regulatory taking was 
constitutionally correct. 
In three sub decisions coming before the 
United States Supreme Court, the question was 
presented agai , but not decided for various procedural 
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reasons which the Court said prevented it from knowing 
whether a taking had actually occurred. However, in the 
first of those cases, San Diego Gas & Electric Company v. 
San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981), Justice Brennan wrote a 
dissenting opinion which was joined by three other justices. 
In his dissent, Justice Brennan expressed the view that the 
Agins rule limiting a property owner's remedy to invalidation 
of a regulation which amounts to a taking was 
constitutionally inadequate because it did not compensate the 
property owner for his loss of the use of his property 
during the time the regulation was in effect before it was 
declared to be valid. It is essentially that view that the 
six justice majority adopted in the First English case. 
In the two cases that followed San Diego Gas in the 
United States Supreme Court/ Willia~son County Reg. Plan. 
Comm. v. Hamilton Bank, supra, and MacDonald Sommer & 
Frates v. County of Yolo, supra, there were again dissenting 
opinions by various combinations of justices who wished to 
reach the remedy question and who expressed the view that the 
Agins rule was incorrect. By the time the First English case 
reached the Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices 
Brennan, White, Powell, and Marshall had all voted against 
the Agins rule in various dissenting opinions, though not all 
in the same case. Thus, unless one of those justices changed 
his mind, it appeared that the Agins rule would be held 
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nva f l a the is st!e d be 
But in each of the four ous cases beginning 
with a ori of the justi es had exhibited an 
extreme reluctance to reach the issue until the Court 
was presented with a case ch involved an actual taking by 
regulatory action. Unfortunately, that judicial restraint 
did not carry over to the First case. 
THE FIRST ENGLISH CASE 
(a) And Its Flood. 
The Church s prope consists of 21 acres of land 
in the mountains north of the C of Los les, about 23 
le from the suburban o Gl l . The prope lies 
wi n a national forest but it is privately owned and 
ject to the jurisdicti of of Los les for 
building permit and z s. +- s s tuated in a ,_ 
ry narrow canyon known s Iv1i l reek ll Creek, 
ch is a natura water rsej lows the canyon. 
The prope i z R-R" Re rt and 
Recreation), which sa lassificat on established to provide 
outdoor recre on and tural uses suitable for 
devel without si ficant impa rment to the resources 
of the area. The prope is de i on the County's 
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General Plan maps as being reserved for open space purposes 
including outdoor recreation and resource production and 
preservation. The Church has never challenged these 
classifications. 
The Church acquired the property in 1957 and over 
the next 20 years built various structures and recreational 
facilities on the premises using mostly donated labor and 
services. The property, which was known as "Lutherglen," was 
used as a weekend retreat and summer camp for Church members 
and their guests and as a year-around camping facility for 
handicapped children and adults of all denominations. All of 
the structures except for some water tanks were located on 12 
acres of relatively flat land at the bottom of the canyon, 
along both sides of Mill Creek. The remainder of the 
Church's 21 acres has higher elevations with varying degrees 
of slope, most of which probably would be too steep to be 
tab as building sites unless cost was no object. The 
structures on the canyon bottom consisted of a single cabin 
which served as the residence of the caretaker; a main lodge 
used for dining and recreationi a dormitory or bunk house 
divided into two sections with attached shower and restroom 
facilitiesi a swimming pool, volleyball court, outdoor 
chapel, and a footbridge across the creek. There were also 
some moveable trailers on the property which were used to 
house the camp's staff. 
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rt to note, then, that the available 
uses for Lutherglen were quite limited because of its 
ocation, and the underl ng zoning, even before 
the County adopted the flood protection ordinance which the 
Church contends was a taking of the property. Unfortunately, 
even those limited uses proved to be very dangerous. 
It is common knowledge in California that flash 
floods occur in the mountain canyons during periods of heavy 
rains and that such floods represent a serious hazard to 
human life and property. Indeed, when the structures were 
construcLed on Lutherglen, the County required the Church to 
do a number of things to t against flooding and 
erosion. This included the cons ruction of a floodwall along 
one side of the prope and the construction of the 
foo dge as a "bre bri which would 
easily from its foundation in the event of a flood. This was 
to the bridge from building up a large volume of 
water before fina y ving way, the caus ng a sudden 
surge of water downstream. Despite these precautions, 
several of the structures on Lutherglen were severely 
damaged, though not de , w.hen a flood occurred in the 
canyon in 1969. At that time, the a lowed the Church 
to rebuild the st 
In late Jul of 977, a fire occurred in the 
les National Forest causing a or loss of watershed 
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which, in turn, magnified the already existing danger of 
flooding in the Mill Creek area. Shortly after the fire, the 
Los Angeles County Flood Control District warned all of the 
property owners in the area that there was a significant 
flood hazard. The predicted flash flood came between 1:30 to 
2:30 in the morning of February 10, 1978, after two days of 
very heavy rain. It was devastating. A massive wall of 
water, mud and debris rushed down Mill Creek Canyon 
destroying all of the camps and other properties in the 
canyon bottom. Lutherglen's structures were totally 
obliterated. Ten people were killed on adjacent property. 
It was only through sheer fortuity that no deaths occurred at 
Lutherglen. Lutherglen had been scheduled to be used on 
February 10, 1978, by a group of handicapped children, but 
their camping trip had been postponed for one week. 
(b) The County's Flood Protection Ordinances. 
On January 11, 1979, the County adopted the 
temporary flood protection ordinance which wa·s the subject of 
the Church's suit. The ordinance recited that it was ''[a]n 
interim ordinance temporarily prohibiting the construction, 
reconstruction, placement or enlargement of any building or 
structure within any portion of the interim flood protection 
area delineated within Mill Creek, vicinity of Hidden 
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provisions of California law applicable to "interim zoning 
ordinances" which take effect immediately as an urgency 
measure "to protect public safety, health and welfare." Such 
measures expire automatically after four months unless they 
are extended in accordance with certain statutory procedures. 
The maximum period of time such an ordinance could remain in 
effect, if so extended, was two years. The County Board of 
Supervisors did extend the ordinance for the maximum period. 
A permanent ''flood protection district" was then established 
and added to the County's zoning code by an ordinance adopted 
on August 11, 1981. 
The geographical boundaries of the permanent flood 
protection district were identical to those of the interim 
flood protection ordinance which it superseded. The flood 
protection area consisted of a linear shaped parcel 
approximately 250 feet in width and 3600 feet in length which 
followed the course of the existing creek channel and 
included additional area on both sides of the channel to 
provide reasonable protection from overflow of flood waters, 
bank erosion and debris deposition. Because of the 
narrowness of the Canyon at the Church's property, all of the 
Church's twelve acres of flat land were included within the 
flood protection area. The provisions of the permanent 
ordinance were drafted to comply with the federal flood 
insurance regulations and have been accepted by the federal 
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government s ng i comp e wi those re a ons. 
ordinance are not as restr c as were those of the interim 
ordinance, but there is no doubt that they would prohibit ~he 
Church from rebuilding Lutherglen the way it was before the 
flood. Since the Church has never applied for permission 
to build anything on the property under the permanent 
ordinance, we do not know what kinds of structures would be 
permitted the Engineer. am informed by the 
County's neers, however, that are of the nion 
that some structures cou d safely constructed on the 
property under the permanent ordinance, but acknowledge 
that it could be more cost y than if the Church was permitted 
to build the way it di before; and it is not likely that the 
Church would be able to bui d al o the structures that 
The permanent ordinance s~ate 
flood s 
ec 
that the area within the 
by the 
Flood Control 
ood hazard." District as being 
The ordinance ts the construction or 
reconstruction of any building or structure within the 
boundaries of the district exc as spec fied therein. 
One of the exc ons pe ts 11 acces ory buildings or 
structures that wil not substantial y the flow 
of water, including gas, electrica and water 
systems, app neer" pursuant to 
certain specif c s Building Code. 
Those sions of the Building Code t any 
construction in a severe flood hazard area, if such 
construction would ncrease the flood hazard to adjacent 
properties. 
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existed before. Despite these restrictions, which the County 
believes are essential for safety purposes, the County 
contends the property is still usable for recreation and 
camping purposes consistent with its underlying zoning 
classification. Many campgrounds are used in California with 
no structures at all; or with only restroom and shower 
facilities, which the County would probably permit the Church 
to build on Lutherglen, if adequate safety precautions were 
taken. 
(c) The Church's Suit And The Proceedings In The State 
Court. 
The Church did not wait to find out what type of 
structure might be permitted on Lutherglen under the 
permanent flood protection ordinance. Instead, the Church 
commenced its lawsuit on February 21, 1979, a little over a 
month after the temporary ordinance was first enacted. The 
Church sued both the County and the Los Angeles County Flood 
Control District, which was then a separate governmental 
entity, claiming that they were responsible for the damage 
caused by the February 10, 1978 flood under a variety of 
different legal theories, including inverse condemnation and 
tort liability. In addition, the Church asserted an inverse 
condemnation claim against the County based on the allegation 
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the ra rotec ion ordinance e ec~ed a 
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appealed to the California Court of Appeals. 
By the time the case reached the California Court 
of Appeals, Agins had been affirmed by the United States 
Supreme Court without reaching the remedy question and the 
San Diego Gas case had been decided, also without reaching 
the remedy question. But because of Justice Brennan's 
dissent in San Diego Gas, the Church argued to the California 
Court of Appeals that the Agins remedy rule was incorrect and 
should not be followed. The California Court of Appeals 
disagreed and held that until the United States Supreme Court 
finally decided the question, it was obligated to follow the 
California Supreme Court's Agins decision. Based on that 
ruling, the appellate court affirmed the lower court's order 
striking the regulatory taking claim. 
It is important to note that neither the lower 
court nor the Court of Appeal ever discussed the sufficiency 
of the Church's allegations to state a claim for a regulatory 
taking.~/ Likewise, they did not address the health and 
~/ Since the Church never sought to amend its complaint to 
state a claim for declaratory relief or mandamus, as 
permitted under the Agins rule, the California courts 
were not required to consider whether the Church had 
alleged sufficient facts to establish a regulatory 
taking, as the courts did in Agi~§- Nor did the Church 
ever amend its complaint to claim a regulatory taking 
based on the County's permanent flood protection 
ordinance. At all stages of the proceeding, the suit 
was based solely on the temporary ordinance. 
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safety justification for the County's temporary flood 
protection ordinance. In essence, both courts regarded the 
Church's all ions as being irrelevant regardless of 
whether they were sufficient to state a meritorious claim, 
because the Church had sought an rmissible remedy. It 
was this procedural quirk that the United States Supreme 
Court majority siezed upon to justify reaching the remedy 
question in this case after it had ducked the issue in four 
previous cases. 
(d) The United States Court And 
The Issues And Contentions Of The Parties. 
After the Church's petition for a hearing in the 
California Supreme Court was denied, leaving the dec~sion of 
the California Court of Appeals to stand as the tinal state 
court ruling in the matter, the Church then appealed to the 
United States Court, invoking the Court's appellate 
jurisdiction rather than ce iorari jurisdiction. \·Jhereas 
certiorari jurisdiction is entirely discret1onary with the 
Court, it must hear appeals if the requistte conditions for 
I and my firm were 
this case when it reached 
Court. 
to represent the County in 
the United States Supreme 
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appellate jurisdiction are present. In essence, appellate 
jurisdiction exists whenever a state statute or local 
government ordinance is challenged as being repugnant to the 
United States Constitution and is upheld by a state court as 
being constitutional. 
In its jurisdictional statement to the United 
States Supreme Court, the Church claimed that all of the 
requisites for appellate jurisdiction were present. Yet, the 
thrust of the Church's arguments were not really aimed at 
challenging the validity or constitutionality of the County's 
temporary flood protection ordinance at all. Rather, the 
Church aimed all of its guns at the claimed invalidity of the 
Agins rule. One of the arguments we made on behalf of the 
County in the Supreme Court was that the jurisdictional 
requirements for appellate jurisdiction were not present 
here, as the Church claimed, but the Supreme Court majority 
disagreed. We believe the Court's reasoning on that point 
(as well as on several others) was incorrect, but that is now 
ancient history. 
In view of the fact noted previously that five of 
the present Supreme Court justices had already indicated 
their disagreement with the Agins rule in various dissenting 
opinions, it appeared that the Court would probably decide 
that the Agins rule was incorrect if a majority of the 
justices voted to reach the remedy issue. But it also 
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also that the Court itself had recognized in previous 
decisions that such ordinances are entitled to special 
consideration and carry with them a presumption of validity 
which can be overcome only by a showing that the ordinance 
was actually adopted for some other improper purpose, or that 
it imposes restrictions which are more onerous than what is 
reasonably necessary to meet the particular peril. In the 
instant case, the Church alleged no facts which would 
overcome this presumption of validity. At no time has the 
Church ever contended that the flood protection ordinance was 
adopted for an improper purpose or that the restrictions 
imposed are more onerous than what is reasonably necessary to 
protect against the hazard of future flooding. 
We further pointed out in our arguments to the 
Court that under these precedents going back at least 100 
years, reasonable regulations prohibiting only dangerous uses 
of property are not considered to be takings for a public 
purpose in the constitutional sense, and compensation to the 
affected property owner is not required.lQ/ 
lQ/ The cases we relied upon are all cited with approval in 
footnote 4 of the dissenting opinion by Justice Stevens 
in First English. The most recent case on the subject, 
Keystone Coal Association v. De Benedictis, supra, was 
decided only three months prior to First English, and 
fully supports the County's position, just as Justice 
Stevens states in his dissent. 
Another or a 
its amici was that the 
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advanced by the County and 
had not in fact denied all use 
of the prope to the Church. The Church sued solely on the 
temporary ordinance which did no more than temporarily 
prohibit the building of any structures in the canyon bottom 
until the matter could be studied and a permanent ordinance 
adopted. The Church did not allege any facts to show why its 
property could not still be used for recreational purposes, 
including camping, without structures. Furthermore, the 
permanent ordinance, which the Church has never challenged, 
plainly allows some structures to be built if the County 
ineer is satisfied that ate safety measures can be 
employed. The Church has never even tried ~o see what would 
be permitted under the permanent ordinance. 
In contrast with these s, most of the 
a s advanced the Church and its many amici curiae 
challenge the correctness of the rule without 
regard to the actual facts of this art cular case. 
a that the Court could and should decide the remedy 
i sue without deciding whether the:t'e was actually a taking in 
this case, because the California courts had done so. Our 
answer to that was that even the California courts had 
not decided whether there was a taki the reme Court 
coul see for itself, as a matter of law, that no taking was 
properly alleged; and the question of what the proper remedy 
- 61 -
should be for a regulatory taking should not be decided in a 
case where no taking could possibly have occurred under the 
facts appearing in the record. To decide the remedy question 
under such circumstances would be the equivalent of rendering 
an advisory opinion, in a vacuum, which could only cause 
further confusion and uncertainty. 
Finally, the County urged that if the Court should 
decide to reach the remedy question in this case, it should 
hold that the Agins rule was correct. We argued that a 
property owner should not be able to sue immediately for 
compensation in inverse condemnation for an alleged 
regulatory taking, but rather he should be required to sue to 
have the regulation invalidated for all of the reasons given 
by the California Supreme Court. We also pointed out that 
the question of whether a property owner should be able to 
recover some compensation for the claimed loss of use of his 
property during the period the regulation was in effect prior 
to its being declared invalid, was never actually raised or 
decided in ~ins or in the present case. The County, and all 
of its amici curiae, argued that it is a misnomer to call 
that temporary loss of use of the property a "temporary 
taking," because it is not really a ''taking" at all under the 
Court's many earlier precedents. 
Based on those existing precedents, the County 
argued that a zoning ordinance or other land use regulation 
2 -
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process. Delays o that nature have never been considered to 
rise to the evel f a taki again, because, at the most, 
represent a mere diminution n the value of the 
prope 
lue. 
e) 
as disti 
The 
a 
ion in this case 
decide whether a 
a 
all ions of the c 
had been 
shed a destruc ion of al 
Remain 
opin th 
esti as l for 
the Ca ifornia courts did 
curred. The Court jected 
i lf ate the 
term ne whethe a taking" 
rt reasoned that because 
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the California courts had relied on the Agins rule as the 
sole basis for their decision, they apparently assumed that 
the Church's bare allegation of a denial of all use of 
Lutherglen sufficiently alleged a taking to at least raise 
the remedy question. The Supreme Court felt that it could do 
the same thing. It then proceeded to decide that the Agins 
rule was incorrect. 
In so doing, however, the opinion by Justice 
Rehnguist makes it abundantly clear that the majority was not 
deciding whether the County's temporary flood protection 
ordinance actually denied all use of the property- i.e., 
whether it actually effected a taking. The Court further 
stated that it was not deciding whether the ordinance was 
insulated from the taking claim as part of the County's 
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au~hority to enact safe 
l 1 . regulations.-~/ We interpret that 
as being an l the majority of the 
correctness of the County's legal argument that a regulation 
which prevents a dangerous use of prope 
compensable taking. The court simply felt 
is not a 
•t-
.1 y could ignore 
that point and proceed to decide the remedy que::::c:ion because 
of the manner in which the case had been decided by the 
California courts. In essence, the Court obviously believed 
it was presented with a golden opportunity to put the remedy 
question to rest once and for all, \vi thout actua ly having to 
11/ The exact language of Court's nion on this point 
reads as follows: 
11 1rle reject c:.ppellee' s suggestion that, 
ess of the state court's treatment of the 
on, we must i ly evaluate the 
y of the complaint and resolve the takings 
claim on the merits before we can reach the 
remedial question. However 'crypt:.ic' - to use 
appellee's descr ion- the allegations with 
respect to the taking were, the California coqrts 
deemed them sufficient to present the isst:e. \Ale 
accordingly have no occasion to decide whether the 
ordinance at issue ac ally denied appe lant all 
use of its property or \vhether the County might 
avoid the conclusion that a compensable taking had 
occurred by establishing that the denial of all use 
was insulated as a of the state's authority to 
regulati s. 
c-:--::-----::---··------,..-~·--a __ d __ , 3 6 9 U S . 0 ( 1 9 6 2 ) ; 
----=~~----=-c:.:_::__::c_.:.:: __ _:_.:__..:cs'-e~b:=_:_a:..s,'-..... -=-'-. =i_a,:...:...cn , 2 3 9 U . S . 3 9 4 ( 1 9 15 )i 
Kansas, 3 U.S. 623 (1887). These 
----,--------:----
questions, of course, remain open for decision on 
the remand we direct today." (sl op. at 7-8) 
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find fault with the County's ordinance. 
In deciding the remedy issue, the Supreme Court 
first interpreted the California Court of Appeals' decision 
in this case as holding that a landowner who claims his 
property has been taken by a land use regulation may not 
recover damages for the time before it is finally determined 
that the regulation constitutes a taking of his property. 
Actually, as I have already mentioned, that precise question 
was not presented or decided in the lower courts in this 
case, nor was it presented or decided in ns. In both this 
case and ns, the landowners sought compensation only for 
-~'-----
an alleged permanent taking of their property without ever 
specifically asking for damages limited to the time prior to 
the court's ruling on whether there was a taking. Nor was 
there any discussion in either case as to whether a 
In contrast, the dissent Justices Stevens, O'Connor 
and Blackmun was extreme critical of the ority's 
decision precisely because the majority decided the 
issue in a case where it was clear that no taking 
possibly occurred. As Justice Stevens put 
Even I believe the Court's lack of 
self restraint is imprudent, it is imperative to 
stress that the Court does not hold that appellant 
is entitled to compensation as a result of the 
ood protection regulation the County enacted. No 
reatter whether the regulation is treated as one 
that rives appellant of its property on a 
permanent or temporary basis, this Court's 
precedents demonstrate that the type of regulatory 
program at issue here cannot constitute a taking." 
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" emporary taking" ould have occurred duri that interim 
period of time. 
Nevertheless, the Court considered that to 
be the real issue - I~_:_, whether the v.Tong on 
the ground that the constitution mandates the payment of 
compensation for the period of time to a judicial 
determination that the rmanent regulation (if allowed to 
stand) would effect a taking. On that issue. the Court 
rejected all of our arguments as to why there should be no 
taking at all where nothing more has occut-red than a 
temporary loss of use of the property, or a d~lay in 
development of the property. The majori said it could see 
no difference between a rary denial of all use of the 
property and a permanent taking. The Court reasoned that if 
compensation was required for a 
then compensation must also be 
l t k. 1 reguLa cry ta lng. 
rary 
d for a 
The ori oncluded, however, 
rary 
s ng t.hat 
1 The dissenting nion stice Stevens with 
the County's argument that there is a significant 
difference between a sical taking of property and one 
which occurs so ely by virtue of restraints on the use 
of property imposed under a la::1d use regulation; and 
that no regulatory taking should be found to occur where 
there has merely been a diminution in \"alue caused by a 
loss of all se of prope , as distinguished 
total destruction of value which would result 
from a rmanent ass of al use. 
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''[w]e limit our holding to the facts presented, and of course 
do not deal with the quite different questions that would 
arise in the case of normal delays in obtaining building 
permits, changes in zoning ordinances, variances, and the 
like which are not before us." What this means is anything 
but clear, since the Court had alre said earlier in its 
opinion that it was not deciding whether there was a taking 
in this case. 
One possible interpretation of the majority opinion 
v!ould be that temporary denial of all use of property can 
be regarded as a taking for which compensation must be paid, 
no matter how short in duration the loss of use may be or 
what it is that causes the temporary loss of use. If that is 
means, it would seem that every 1 timate building 
moratoria and other of proper interim ordinances 
re cting and use mi be vulnerab e to attack and could 
re + ' v l liabili for the adopting ic entity. But I do 
not thi that is what the Court would actually hold if it 
were faced with such a question. Once the Court is put in a 
position of having to deal th whether a taking has actually 
occurred in a cular situation, I think it is likely that 
the Co~rt will modi 1 or at least clari , some of the 
overbroad language it used in this case to bring the decision 
more in line ith some of the Court s ous holdings on 
the subject of regulatory takings. 
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Assuming there is a legitimate purpose for a 
temporary land use restriction, and that the restriction is 
not to remain in effect for an undue length of time or for an 
indefinite period, the Court should hold that there is no 
taking because nothing more than a diminution in value has 
occurred. Since there is no total destruction of the value 
of the property, the public interest should be deemed to 
outweigh the private interest. In essence, this should be 
regarded as a "normal delay" in the right to develop property 
of the type that must be expected in a regulated society. 
Certainly, this should be the result in any case where the 
Court considers the three factors first identified in the 
Penn Central case, discussed above. 
On the other hand, unless the Court modifies its 
opinion in a subsequent case, it clearly must be read to 
stand for the proposition that if a regulation goes 
too far and would amount to a taking if it is allowed to 
tand, the landowner will then be entitled to recover damages 
for the interim period of time that the re<Julation is in 
effect before it is judicially declared to be a taking and is 
abandoned by the public entity. Accordingly, something like 
a permanent open space zoning ordinance which denied a 
property owner any economical viable use of his land would 
almost certainly result in some monetary award against the 
local government that adopted it. How that amount would be 
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determined will have to await further judicia explanation, 
however, since the Court gave no 
To conclude, then, it is my 
on that point. 
ction that the 
First English case ultimately should not result in actual 
liability being imposed on local governments in any but the 
most egregious cases of over zealous zoning. So long as some 
economically viable use is available to a 1 1 he 
should have no taking claim for zoning s, including 
down zoning, if 1 
see nothing in the 
timate reasons exist for such changes. 
case ch indicates that 
I 
Court i going to be any more willing to second guess the 
decisions of land use planners a to what constitutes a 
timate z 
Court has y said if you go , you will have to 
pay for it. No new li has ally been shed on when or how 
that oc 
The nc 1 from the First ish -----------~-----
decision is that it may well set off the liti on explosion 
p cted Justice Stevens' ssent. The threat of having 
to defend nst such suits and the exposure to possible 
li lity may cause and use planners to so timid that 
p anning is i to meet the 1 c's l 
fully, some of the unanswered 
uncertainties created by the ori 
timate needs. 
stions and 
will be 
resolved in later court ru ings. I the meantime, and use 
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planners certai l must be more circumspect about the 
consequences of their actions, but at the same should 
guard against becoming overly cautious. Good zoning 
practices which did not "take" prope prior to the .first 
lish case should remain perfectly safe, as well as 
desirable, in the aftermath of that decision. 
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Re: Committee Hearing on Land Use 
Dear Senators: 
CJM 
Enc 
On behalf of the County of 
iti enti " 
ifornia's Private Attorney 
Senate 
a 
LTR- 7 
DE 
{213) 974-1845 
ion 
, we are submitting an 
Revisions to 
" for consideration 
i its review of 
13, 1987. 
J. MOORE 
1 Deputy 
Counsel 
The inc 1 f om 
Angeles decision is that it 
TO 
STATUTE 
case 
v. The County of Los 
well set off the litigation 
explosion Just ce Stevens 1 ssent. threat of 
having to defend nst ts, most of which will be 
unproductive, is causi t ies to reflect upon the 
inadequate California laws concerning attorneys' fees awards. 
We believe that 
of attorneys' fees 
and unproductive lit 
revisions whi 
overdue. 
we 
The Private Attor 
criteria: 
(1) t 
fecti i 
signficant 
necessity and 
tiff must be succe s 
i 
nt 
n 
ff 
•s statutory authority for awards 
sed, in light of the predicted 
ion, although three 
ng are already 
, as codified in Code of 
021.5 izes an award of 
cant meets ng general 
must i an important right 
st; ( 2) ts must confer a 
ic; issue must involve the 
ivate nt; ( 4) the plain-
receive an award. See, e.g., 
Serrano v • st 1977 20 Cal. 3d 25; Serrano v. Unruh (1982) 
...;...............;.._ 
32 Cal. 3d 621. re to act involving public entities, 
'the statute does 
entities .. 
should be made a 
attor s' fees. 
a chi its s 
a 
Cali nia 
's 
in 
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ize 
success 
1 
d 
is 
not 
in 
attorneys• issue in cases 
di i nti 
re s 
ori 
ies 
1 s 
1 
f to 
i a 
is Uni States s 
983) 1 u.s., 
In 
in suit unsucce 
in of public 
ntiff 
t uation of 
so the 
its success in 
on issues it 
grappled with the 
is an enormous 
ves and the 
success relative to 
es and 
against a 
excluding 
been 
ion f unsuccessful 
result 
in v. 
93 76 L. . 2d 40. 
us ion hours 
i tioners 
reli 
to 
t 
in 
to 
car 
Court 
is 
never s ned to e 
f a test to limit hours 
i 
If • • a 
1 
nt ff 
succes 
wrote 
or 
s reasonably 
expended on ion as a whole times a 
rate an excessive amount. 
true even This 
cla 
in 
were inter 
of 
intiff to 
tious 
11 
is 
Private At tor 
t a s 
a 
s some issue 
i 
tri 
a 
ss 
plaintiff's 
rivolous and raised 
not i an 
it was reasonable for a 
t or whenever 
case devotion and 
461 U.S. at 436, 
be amended 
s to i 
s 1 
to assert 
a stimulus 
issue assert meritorious claims which 
i success 
res a two- analysis. First, the 
must assess ntiff failed to prevail on 
that were to on whi succeeded. 
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·If such unrelated issues exist, 
be iminated from recovery. 
on claim~ must 
u.s. at 435. Next, with 
regard to Court on s ificance 
of the overall rel ined the ntiff in relation to 
the hours reasonably expended on litigation. 461 U.S. at 
435. If less re ts were achi on related 
cla the court should i 461 u.s. 
at 436. 
Federal rcuit court cases so ate that the amount 
of a plaintiff's fee is a direct result of 
what ntiff actual • See, e.g., 
v. 733 F.2d. 55 (8th 
c 1984), v. , 769 F. 796 (D.C. Cir. 1985), 
v. Argento, 808 F. 2d 1242 (7th r. 1987), Foster v. Board of 
8 F 1021 ( • 1987) Spanish Action 
29, 1135 (7th 
r 87} 
ute d fy that 
s recovery for 
t i some which 
were tial are li se excessive. 
Pri General statute d be amended so 
are as if had been 
rai ts no be awarded 
for ce on unsucce statute should 
pr i t fees for unsucces i are carried by 
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unrel , successf a 
, nt a award is wholly 
unwarranted. i a courts have not recently 
addres is issue, 
virtually elimi 
cases. 
use 
ted States Supreme Court has 
a fee multiplier in federal 
In considering the issue of enhancement of a base fee 
or lodestar figure (i.e., number of hours actually worked 
times a reasonable rate), the California courts 
traditionally have considered whether (1) some enhancement of the 
historical rate is necessary to account for the delay in payment 
and (2) whether an ti multiplier is warranted because of 
certain factors like the ri involved, the skill of the 
attorneys, the novelty or complexity of issues, and the results 
achieved. We conte 
issue and the statute 
no enhancement is warranted on either 
enhancements or 
Moreover, 
multi ier. I 
and the 11 
reasonable 
d 
ti iers 
tr in 
es like 
at tor 
rate, 
concluded that such 
i the 
a 
to prohibit such 
se fee or lodestar figure. 
law is away from awarding any 
conti nature of the case 
ved are accounted for in the 
United States Supreme Court has 
inappropriate incentives 
In Blum v. , 465 u s. 886, 79 L.Ed. 2d 891, 104 s.ct. 
1541 (1984}, the United States Supreme Court considered whether, 
and under circumstances, an upward adjustment of an 
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attorneys' fees award under 42 u.s.c. Section 1988 is 
appropriate. In reversing 
upward adjustment, the Supreme 
issues, quality of representat 
not provide independent bases 
strict Court's fifty percent 
held novel or complex 
, or the results achieved, do 
augmenting the award of 
attorneys' fees. The Court concluded by holding that the basic 
fee award, or lodestar figure, is to be the reasonable 
fee to which counsel is entitled. 465 U.S. at 897: also see 
Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens Council for Clean Air, 
478 U.S. , 92 L.Ed.2d 439, 106 S. • 3088(1986). 
No Cali case has cons these issues relating to 
enhancements and tipliers 
Legislature should act to 
creating windfalls for 
is no justifi 
stat 
at tor s 1 fees for succes 
counter 
which i 
a ion 
ive incentive 
, if 
s finance 
it from a statute 
on 
ic 
s li 
ic enti 
i 
to recover its attor 
awards; the California 
ication of multipliers 
courts have said there 
nst lowance of 
entities should also be 
s a 
unmeri ious claims 
of success. The 
ies' legal defense should 
izes a successful 
' fees where an important public 
right 
litigation 
ic interest is vindicated and the 
ts 
significant benefit on 
by 
public 
ic entity confer a 
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HEARING BEFORE THE SENATE COMMITTEE 
ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
COMMENTS OF TIMOTHY A. BITTLE 
REGARDING NOLLAN v. CALIFORNIA COASTAL COMMISSION 
13, 1987 
RONALD A. ZUMBRUN 
ROBERT K. BEST 
TIMOTHY A. BITTLE 
Pacific Legal Foundation 
555 Capitol Mall, Suite 350 
Sacramento, CA 95814 
Telephone: (916) 444-0154 
Attorneys for Pacific Legal 
Foundat 
The constitu i 
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STEP 1 
na is, or "test" if you prefer, 
employed the United States Supreme Court in Nollan v. 
California stal Cornmissi begins at Section II of the 
opinion. The Court begins with a fundamental premise. The 
premise is that uncompensat dedication requirements, standing 
alone, are unconstitutional 
"Had California simply required the 
Nollans to make an easement across their 
bea front available to lie ••• rather 
ir permit we have no conditioning 
doubt there would been a taking." 
Next, the Court poses a question 
"Gi n, that requiring 
cornpensat nee of t easement 
r t wou d ate the Fourteen 
Amendme t 
i s a 1 
tcome. 
se 
comes ther 
as a condition 
it alters 
Th Cour assumes a set of facts that would alter 
outcome. fica! Court assumes that the Coastal 
Commission could 
wit t violating 
assumes t an outr g 
viable economic use t 
denied 
Cons ituti 
de i 
d 
ans rmit outright 
In r words, the Court 
ld leave the lans with a 
se) and would not 
substantially 
e eta ons 
te f re 
We ass 
0 -
r reasonable investment-backed 
thout de ing, 
would be ab to ny the Comm ssion 
Nollans thei 
denial would 
the Nollans 
rmit outright ••• unless the 
re so drastical with 
use ir r as to 
constitute a taking " 
I refer to the 
analysis. For a dedication 
as the "f rst step" of the Nollan 
ition to be lawful, it must 
first pass this s t is, the governmental agency must 
rmit being applied for. I have the lawf r to deny 
look at it this 
alone, are unconsti 
dedication condition 
the owner's 
"t ir r hts. 
permit for the owner s 
dedication 
"trade, t 
be constitut 
s nee 
iona , 
at ion 
owner 
irements, standing 
a ri to resist 
has a 1 
r a 
ul right to 
age 
is the agency can agree to issue a 
ct prov 
r 
the owner accepts a 
re err ng to it as a 
that ded cation requirements can 
are mere a substitute for denial. 
Commission argues that a permit 
condition 
police 
t serves the same legitimate 
as a refusal to issue 
the permit not be found to be a taking 
if refusal to issue permit would not 
constitute a ing. We agree." 
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The Court's characterization provides an easy 
transition into "second s ep" of the Nollan analysis. 
STEP 2 
Having determined t a permit denial would still 
leave the owner with a vi 
substantially interfere wi 
e economic use, and would not 
his reasonable investment-backed 
expectations, it does not necessarily follow that his permit can 
therefore be denied for ~ reason 
could not deny a permit because 
For example, an agency 
icant was black. Nor 
pure arbitrary reasons, could agency de a permi 
such as a feeling by applicant was already 
rich enough and did not need prqfits that would be generated 
by this project. Rather, a denial must substantially advance a 
legit te state interest 
We have long nized t land use 
not ffect a taking if it 
a t al n 1 leg t te state 
and not 'de !y an owner 
viable use his 
Our cases have not ela rat 
standards for deterrn ni 
on e 
t constitutes a 
legit te state interest' or t type of 
connection tween 
s te interest s tisf 
the rmer 's tantial 
regulation and the 
requirement t t 
advance' the 
latter. They have made clear, however that 
In t 
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a range governmental purposes and 
regulat ons sa sfies se requirements." 
that among these lan case 
.:.;...;::..;;;;_:::...::.:..;..:. Court ass 
permissible pu es was the state's desire to protect public 
views of the ocean. 
Since ication requirements are constitutional only 
when they are a substitute a lawful denial, then the 
dedication requirement must substantially advance the same state 
purpose that would justify an outright denial. So, in the 
Nollan case, the Supreme Court conceded that, if the Nollans' 
permit could have been denied because their new house would 
block public views, a dedication condition that preserved public 
views would constitut 
, if Commission attached to 
the permit some condition that would have 
protected the lie's ability to see the 
beach notwi i constuction of the new 
house-- r example, a height limitation, a 
wi restriction, or a ban on fences--so 
as the Commission could have exercised 
its police power (as we have assumed it 
cou ) to forb construction of the house 
altogether, ition of the condition would 
also be constitut 1 •••• The evident 
constitut al iety disappears, however, 
if the ition titu for the 
ib t on utter fa ls to further the end 
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advanced as the justification for the 
prohibition When t essential nexus is 
eliminated, the situation becomes the same as 
if Cali ia law forbade shouting fire in a 
crowded theater, but granted dispensations to 
those willing to contr bute $100 to the state 
treasury." 
Thus, to pass "second step" of the Nollan 
analysis, the agency imposing permit condition must identify 
a legitimate state interest that would justify denial of the 
permit. The dedication requirement must substantially advance 
the same state interest. In the No lan case, since providing 
people alre 
s ved the 
the No 
on the 
new 
a broader beach to walk on in no way 
motorists e ocean views were blocked 
se, t dedication condition did not 
s 
The 
tantial 
it 
vance the state's interest in view protection. 
re re failed. 
LUSION 
The "first s II 
law. It means t t if an 
the Nollan ana sis is brand new 
ncy cannot say "no" to a permit 
ire no dedication conditions (or appl cation, en i 
fee in lieu thereof 
may 
whatsoever. A common situation is as 
ollows: an cant owns one single-family lot. Because of 
its 1 size, it is unsuitab 
residential development. It is 
fami residential use. 
any purpose other than 
exclusively for single-
applies for a permit to build a 
single-family home one use his r is zoned for and 
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suitable for, the permitting age does not have a lawful right 
to say "no" to t permit lication. To do so would leave 
the owner th no vi economic use for his land. Since the 
agency does not ld the ri to deny the permit, it has 
nothing to trade with. Therefore, the agency cannot require a 
dedication from owner for park purposes, street-widening 
purposes, or any other purpose. Fees in lieu of a dedication 
cannot be imposed either. 
The "second s • of the Nollan analysis also 
dramatically alters the law, at least in California. Whereas in 
Grupe v. California Coastal Commission, 166 Cal. App. 3d 148 
(1985), the California Court of Appeal held that dedication 
requirements were ul even if the project standing alone had 
not created the need dedication, and even if there was 
on an indirect relationsh 
and a need to which 
condition must tantial 
between the dedication condition 
ect contributed. Now the dedication 
nee some state interest which 
is strong enough to justify denial of the permit altogether. 
- 85 -
GOVERNMENT!/ 
•THE LIMITS OF LAND USE REGULATION• 
Thank you for the rtunity ti be re your committee 
today. The decisions of Uni Court in its 
most recent 1 term on issues land use planning 
and "regulatory ings" r se rtant questions government 
at all 1 s. As c to a vari state agencies with 
1 use regul , At tor General has a direct 
con tin terest ication constitutional 
principles to 1 use ng. Nevertheless, primary 
r si li f r most use r lation falls to local 
er i It is re re particularly 
t Government has 
come n ion that 
r sions in 
v. 
of 
inte r i spa rate 
i se cases. re not surprising 
stant 
1. Testi 
M. Frank. 
esent 
among those charged 
torney General Richard 
res i 1 r con 
i 
f 
ss 
19 
6 -
to 
s 
rt's constitutional 
u t ty for 
overcome that confusion. 
ons r committee, 
stressed. First, the Supreme Court 
ons major importance to 
interested observers 
and No1lan decisions, 
on Keystone Bituminous 
. v 480 u.s. __ , 107 s. . 1232. In 
, the rt d inst constitutional 
ch 1 a state r companies to leave 
s fici i event subsidence of 
su i rej ed the 
ar at d constitute an 
uncons tuti rty. 
1e rtic little applicability 
rece 
i ree opinions, 
mo ramount question of when 
an unconstit i 11 to st. 
is cases re government 
r i sa opposed to 
r c--concerns. ar e i resses the 
- 87 -
Keystone deci on in considerably more detail is attached as 
exhibit "A" to this testimony.) 
A second related po is that land use planning remains 
alive and 1 in California. rary to published reports, 
neither First Lutheran nor Nollan have made radical changes to 
the permissible scope of land use r ation. we believe the 
vast majori current e 1 regulations are 
ed sions and will continue to pass 
constitutional muster. Perhaps most important point to be 
str 
re tion and constitutional 
t ana is, not ion. 
we u to fie cs r the committee. 
Ea t racter z First Lutheran Church 
as i i a or in land use 
1 
No, as i certainly 
a si from sting law California 
Since at least 1979, when 
s . City of Tiburon, 
6 I i t ovided monetary 
were an ac ons challenging so-
1 ra r lato i n rty. 
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ef ctive over es is aspect of the Agins decision 
ires li rni e damages rule previously 
some er state r courts. 
Contra to some ess ac s, does not call into 
question state and local governments' basic land use authority. 
The decision says nothing whatsoever about the constitutional 
limits of land use regulation. (Cf. Keystone.) This is due to 
the simple fact that this latter issue was not presented to the 
Supreme Cou for r ion First English case. 
Noll an represents a less s i change land use law. In 
that case the Supreme Court d that a dedication condition must 
relate to the same ki by the proposed 
development, r is i dually or 
cumu ively. The in found that the access 
condition s ent connected to the harm 
caused the resi i r lopment oject. (Previous 
i rnia state cou i ons invo ing coastal access bad 
e access a less direct 
ion to 1 countenanced in Nollan.) 
2. How these cases publ officials' practices? 
a. What can t ey now they used to do before? 
substant i es of constitutional law set 
forth in require little change in the 
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practices of land use officials. How those individuals will 
perceive the mandate of those decisions is more uncertain. 
Most fundamentally, under First Lutheran public officials will 
henceforth be unable to err on the side of "overregulation" of 
land--however innocently--without being liable for money damages. 
As noted in response to the previous question, following Nollan 
planning officials will be required to predicate project 
conditions on findings that the development has impacts somewhat 
more directly related to the conditions imposed. A clearer nexus 
may thus required than was previously thought necessary by 
some planners. A collateral point is that public agencies may 
attempt to adopt more specific findings to support project 
conditions than were developed in the past. 
b. 11 e cases slow down land use decisions as public 
fi i become more cautious about lawsuits? 
It is simply too early to answer this question with 
ce tai State of California noted in its friend-of-
the-court ief supporting the County of Los Angeles in First 
inter 
abili 
si li that creation of a damages remedy for 
regulatory takin would have a chilling effect on the 
and willi ess of public officials to make land use 
decisions In two months since First Lutheran was decided, 
we are already seeing some instances of this occurring. (It is 
interesti to note that some of the same advocates of a damages 
~ 90 -
r this " illi II 
at is to occur st 
is is a e cation sion.) We are 
ess f rna ori local 
fici s 1 ue to ir land use 
i ons on the merits rather on concerns related to the 
avail li a r r 
As evious is si se cases will result 
in some slow down in land use isions as planning officials 
ir actions and undertake wei 
tional 
decisions. 
ri 
ater taki 
r 
, es, etc. to support r timate 
f 
i 
1 it is ear 
r ear 
tions. Do 
rt r 
s 
more 
1 more reluctant 
for 
the project is ready to 
11 give se 
agree? 
as 
i commences (see below), such delays in 
ans occur in some circumstances. Again, 
more a matter i r ion than any substantive 
rt decisions. irement recent S erne 
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d. Will officials change their practices regarding access 
to navigable waterways, rticularly in the Delta, at Lake 
Tahoe, and ong the coast? 
Respons~: It is of course too early to determine with any 
certainty whether the recent Supreme Court decisions will have a 
major impact on government efforts to promote public access to 
California's navigable waterways. Given state constitutional 
(Art. X, §4), statutory (e.g., Gov. Code§§ 66478.4, 66478.5, 
66478.8 (Subdivision Map Act access requirements)) and common law 
(Gion v. 
e i tly rnment to preserve and promote public 
access to wate , government officials are not likely to 
ignore this import jective. Indeed, past experience 
trates 11 face legal challenge if it 
at sibili this area. (E.g., 
v City of Bakersfield, 170 
12 . ) e , public officials 
r more tention to developing an 
istrative record 11 support decision to require 
acce i a particu r case. Agencies can additionally be 
e to us on non-r 1atory means promote public 
access to e wate as the public trust doctrine-
e same taki issues presented in First 
3. i rnia s rter 
over 
e law i s 
In li 
the recent 
11 not 
erne Court 
fected 
manner an counties or 
4. In 
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t es constitutional authority 
rs 11 11 ither these cases 
r an t counties and 
constitutional dimensions of 
sions it seems that charter cities 
cases in a significantly different 
r law ties. 
Justice Rehnquist said that 
the Court was not deci ng "whether the county might avoid the 
conclusi 
e 
aut ri 
li r 
a 
"s 
a 
rat 
justif cat 
gr 
exclusive 
a 
enact s 
law en 
I 
Does s 
er j 
sa 
e ing had occurred by establishing 
1 use was ins ated as a part of the State's 
lations." 
j fies at ions in name of public 
st only :mentioned 
at or fare 
s fici to justify r at ions that 
? ic saf the acceptable 
court s ecent taki cases appear to give 
ations based on erence to 
s ed 
on aes etic gr is point is further 
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developed in Keystone. Too much should not be read into the 
above-quoted language from 
involved a safety-based lation 
after all, the case 
it is likely that the 
Chief Justice was simply responding to the facts presented. 
5. Government Code § 65858 sets out procedures that counties 
and most cities must follow adopti tempera zoning 
moratoria. The Legi ature adopted the current section in 1982 
and it will "sunset" on January 1, 1989, unless reauthorized. 
The earlier version of the section 11 then apply. 
a. Does the current 1 ge avoid kind of temporary 
re latory i scussed n First Lutheran Church? 
rrent ection 65858 sets r rather stringent 
res low d it choose to adopt 
cer nances. such ordinance 
a ction 65 58 d lik pass 
consti uti must r Pe a more important question is 
er measures is are inherently 
ra stated ew of 
some eve e answer to is question is 
no. no way stands the proposition that, 
e. inter own control measures are constitutionally 
ve. (Su o in s must course on an 
adequate nistrative record.} 
b. ld e slature enew current language? 
We e ess no is t. 
c. Are fur r s d Legislature 
require city councils county boards of supervisors to 
er define I ty, or welfare 
conditions mo rium is meant to resolve? 
The recent s erne rt sions do not compel any 
such nts. As a variety of California court 
is ions make ear, r, state and local entities desiring 
to a such measures lop an ample factual record and 
tai fi i to rt actions. 
d. s ure r utes to conform 
is ? f ones? 
reasons we ieve no 
s are neces 
6. Courts tr tional r 
1 is ures. If state statutes, 1 
icies set by elected 
ordinances, or local 
i tiatives recite 
justification 
courts 11 
ic , or welfare oblems as 
t i luence how the 
or 
Response: Yes. Again, 
rather 
that 1 
the courts. e i t 
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r, it is 
i 11 
e Keystone decision 
most strongly suggests 
rally be respected by 
", attached.) Conversely, the 
absence of detailed findings supporting the imposition of the 
access condition in Nollan was one basis upon which the Court 
based its ion invali ti on. 
7. Do landowners now a better chance of attacking 
regulations which fail to recite the public health, safety, or 
welfare i ons at are meant to resolve? 
Response: The clear both and Nollan is that 
land use regulations 1 to con detailed findings are 
r more ne e constitutional ings claims than those 
co rate su fi 
a. 1 owners more att ion [to] statutory 
i rations legislative intent? 
i on answer s question. 
b 1 s ask Le slature strengthen 
statements slative int statutes that permit 
local lat ons 
n is is a 
ot r tnesseso It is 1 
more conce 
ocal on an 
use re lation. 
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ions 
, however, 
fi 
se i s 
must be directed to 
local officials 
utes which 
authorize local land 
c. Will dr ters local i tiatives and r renda 
strengthen their statements i to immunize them from 
possible legal challenges? 
te lik should recognize, 
however, such fi i s are not required for such initiative 
measures under state 
.3d 810, 823-8 (19 ) • ) 
8. Under a temporary regulatory 
taking start? 
is is one most criti , unanswered questions 
rt 1 s recent onouncements in 
s cases as v. County of 
, 7 u.s. 19 ); Williamson County 
v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 
473 u.s. 2 (1985); v 
(1980) i e 1 owners a final nistrative 
cision as a ition to filing a regulatory takings 
chall It r ore seems reas e to conclude that a 
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temporary taking cannot be deemed to commence prior to the time 
of such administrative action. 
a. How can landowners and public officials distinguish 
between "normal delays" in the land development process and 
delays that lead to regulatory takings? 
Response: The Supreme Court was careful in First Lutheran to 
stress that conventi delays attendant to review of often-
complex development proposals are not the stuff of which 
constitutional in laims are Furthermore, it must be 
kept in mind that it is government's denial of substantially all 
economic use of private property which forms the necessary 
prerequisite for a viable takings claim. A temporary taking 
un r i es ther re seem require 
r tion ays in securing 
rnment act on. 
s i tween normal rmal delay is to 
us on r such ay is the ct legitimate and 
necessa nistrative as opposed to malevolent or 
lous disrega 1 r's ication government 
offici s. 
is issue d seem to be less of a problem in 
Califor a than 0 r jurisdictions inasmuch as the state 
Permit Streamlining Act 884) r res governmental agencies 
to process res ve 
strin me 
- 9 
nt ications under quite 
S 65920 et seq.) 
Final , consti ional " sn rine developed by the 
Su erne Court in 
and related cases requires that a landowner actively seek a final 
nistrative ion on s r 1 before a taking 
claim may be deemed to commence. 
b. Is state 1 sl ion define when a 
temporary r i starts? Or should this 
issue be left to the courts to interpret? 
Ultimately, courts will have to decide such 
princi es of constitut onal law irr ive of legislative 
at s to address ssue. Moreover, the Permit Streamlining 
Act (addressed alr serves to limit the 
e. S 1 to res is question 
satis ctorily in ng rs, Legislature may then find it 
iate to issue. At s point, however, state 
le slation seems emature. 
c. Is state legi ation to guide the courts in how 
to c a 1 r's loss whi occurs during a 
temporary regulat ing? 
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ResRonse: See response to question S(b) above. Certain aspects 
of the state Eminent Domain Law (Code of Civil Procedure § 
1230.010) may prove relevant. Reliance on that statute should 
not be overstressed, however, since conventional condemnation 
principles are often not applicable in the regulatory takings 
context. 
9. If a state regulation is found to be a temporary regulatory 
taking, what is the State General Fund's exposure? 
ResRonse: Like any judgment entered against the state, a damages 
award based on a regulatory takings claim would require a 
specific legislative appropriation for payment. While many such 
claims have been brought against the State of California over the 
years, to our knowled no regulatory takings judgments have ever 
enter a 
such prior cases 
e merits 
ile it can 
nst the state, its agencies or officials. All 
either been settled or won by the state on 
an ci that the number of such lawsuits 
seeki ges will increase in the wake of First Lutheran, we 
not believe the state's financial exposure will be 
substanti ly increased as a result. 
a. a 1 
is found to 
regulation, adopted to implement state law, 
a temporary regulatory taking, what is the 
State General Fund's exposure? 
Response: If a 
ju r 
would ess 
li 
The more ffic 
stat 
against 
ion 
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1 program resulted in a 
government, presumably a claim 
state under Article XIII B(6) of the 
r 
ion is 
Code section 17500 et seq. 
a given state law mandates 
a local program or simply authorizes local action. How the 
courts wi address is question 11 depend largely on the 
facts of the particular case. 
b. What is the process r recovering damages? 
Response: Government Code section 905.1 exempts landowners from 
the obligation to submit r nancial claims to the state 
r prior to filing an inverse (i.e .. , the Board 
condemnation action As not , however, any such court 
j r re a 1 slative appropriation before the 
judgment could be sati 
10. 11 luence current debate over charging fees 
for of s? In rti ar, what about school 
r ? 
decision took pains to sustain 
the general 1 t exaction and land dedications, and 
since Nollan involved te dif rent facts from those presented 
above, that case has little on the question of developer 
rent in the wake of Nollan s. Never ess, 
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that the building industry sees this as an opportune time to 
challenge such fees. A number of lawsuits challenging school 
developer fees, for example, have been filed in the last two 
months. 
Perhaps the sole relevance of Nollan to these cases will be to 
encourage public officials to document further the connection 
between the exaction fee imposed and impacts attributable to a 
particular development. 
11. The traditional test of levying benefit assessments is that 
landowners must pay in proportion to the benefit conferred on 
their property by the facility or service being financed. 
a. Is the "nexus" discussed in Nollan any different? 
Yes. The existing statutory scheme for benefit 
asses s contains its own set of standards and limitations. 
As a er inciple, the connection between such assessments 
and a particular development must be quite direct. (See, e.g., 
v. County of San Diego, 146 Cal.App.3d 772 
(1983) ) The nexus required under Nollan and similar cases is 
less direct and may be predicated upon the cumulative as well as 
i dual effects of a given project. 
b. What can landowners and land use regulators learn from 
assessment practices that will help them nd this nexus? 
The anal to 
assessment act 
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drawn 
1 
en conventional 
ications is 
ra r 1 ted easons s E rience 
gain 
k 
devel 
ovide 
an 
use fi 
for 
important topics. We would 
the 
call on us if we can 
future. 
ovi 
strative record in the former context 
idance preparing the 
0 
r i to present our views on these 
ease to answer any questions 
iti , please feel free to 
r r assistance in the 
nnsylvania Coal to eystone: 
Court's 
akings'' 
I 
iew of 
could run afoul of the Takings 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 
Justice Holmes wrote in Penn-
Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 
415 that "If regula-
too far it will be 
as a taking." In Penn· 
the Court struck 
as such a a Penn-
statute had pro-
in a manner 
caused of land 
on which certain structures were 
located. Three later, 
was still 
c aracterized as the 
"cornerstone" of federal takings 
uri least until 
crucial Supreme 
in this field is 
Transportation Co. 
of New York, 438 U.S. 104 
Penn Central for 
first an analytical 
In which to view 
claims that regula-
effect an unconstitutional 
There the Court identified 
relevant factors "[t]he 
economic of the regula-
tion the ... the ex-
tent to which the has 
erfered with 
backed 
of Law 
the !ice 
const tutio 
private 
fact are the 
takings cases 
the Supreme 
ac-
124. In Penn 
in the 1986-87 term as well 
as the number of such 
"'"'"''""'' the state and 
courts. 
decision 
the latest 
in this complex tale. 
Background 
In 1 the ia. 
Le is at re enactec the 
inous Mine Subsidence 
and Land Act. The 
Act was a reaction to a rather 
dramatic environmental and safe· 
hazard from the 
of western 
as a party. While the Penn-
Coal decision contains 
concerning the alleged 
purpose of the statute in-
volved, Keystone characterizes 
this "uncharacteristic . . . ad-
visory nion" by Justice 
Holmes. U.S.l.W. at 4330. 
Relying on the stated public pur-
pose of the 1966 Act to 
distinguish It from the private 
controversy at the heart of Penn-
sylvania Coal, Justice Stevens 
concluded that "the similarities 
[between the two cases] are far 
less significant than the dif-
ferences, and that Pennsylvania 
Coal does not control this case." 
55 U.S.L.W. at 4329. Thus Justice 
Stevens effectively transforms 
the "cornerstone" of takings 
jurisprudence into mere dictum. 
The Keystone decision next 
proceeded to apply the Penn Cen-
tral criteria to the stated facts. It 
is here that Keystone takes on its 
greatest significance. Whereas 
property owners (and some 
courts) had generally considered 
the economic impact of the con-
tested regulation on the property 
owner to be the key variable, the 
Court for the first time in 
Keystone elevated the "character 
of the governmental action" 
criterion to primary significance. 
The Court pointed out that the 
1966 Subsidence Act was 
pred cated upon detailed 
findings, and that the 
islative purposes involved 
"were genuine, substantial and 
legitimate .... " The majority opi· 
nion notes: 
Commonwealth is acting 
to protect the public interest in 
the environment, and 
the fiscal integrity of the area. 
private individuals [who 
previously contracted away 
their surface rights to the coal 
companies] erred in taking a 
risk cannot estop the State 
from exercising its· police 
power to abate activity akin to 
a public nuisance. 
55 U.S.L.W. at 4331. Keystone 
relies on several pre· 
Pennsylvania Coal cases that 
upheld government's power to 
terminate commercial operations 
found to be offensive, e.g., 

relevant fac-
tors here convinces 
me that the differences between 
and 
impact of the 
is on Pennsylvania Coal, 
that has occupied 
case books and the attention of 
law students for decades. 
to relegate 
to its specific 
facts. The only ongoing 
of Justice Holmes' 
decision is its creation 
of the notion of "regulatory tak-
.. a concept over which the 
Court has equivocated in recent 
years but with which it now 
seems comfortable. See William-
son County Regional Planning 
Commission v. Hamilton Bank of 
Johnson City, 473 U.S 172 (1985); 
and Riverside Bayview Homes v. 
United States, __ u.s. __ , 106 
S.Ct. 455 (1985). 
more significant is 
what Keystone portends for the 
future of government's exercise 
of the police power. Environmen-
tal regulation can be divided into 
two basic categories: the first is 
the more traditional type which 
seeks to prevent or minimize 
harmful private conduct. Hazar-
dous waste, air pollution and 
water quality laws are prominent 
examples. The second category 
seeks primarily to promote 
aesthetic values important to a 
well-ordered community. Plann-
and zoning laws most typical· 
these concerns. 
strongly suggests 
of analysis 
Clause, the 
of government activi-
treated with more 
the courts. Given 
the broad language of Keystone, 
it will be difficult for plaintiffs to 
overcome the presumption of 
that attaches to such 
measures. assumes, of 
course, that government can 
justify its regulatory actions on 
the basis of strong findings and 
an ample record-factors which 
the majority found to exist in 
Keystone.) 
That significance 
extends beyond the coal 
fields of western Pennsylvania 
can be seen from one local exam-
California and Nevada have 
'"''"''"'""'" a bistate compact which 
creates the Tahoe Regional Plan· 
Agency (TAPA) and gives 
that agency broad authority to 
""'"'""u~"' on page 7) 
Deputy At-
California 
He re-
Davis 
e 
r 1 stry Association 
1107 - SUITE 060 • CA 95814 • Phone (916) 443-7933 
Senate Government Committee 
13, 1987 Sacramento CA 
Subject: u.s. 
First Lutheran Nol 
Court's Decisions in 
Limiting Local Governments 
It is not my purpose to br you a comprehensive review of the two 
Court decisions on California land use practices. Your 
witnesses earlier had both that task and the credentials for 
that assignment. 
My purpose is to br you some observations on how the decisions 
might t a few areas of land use which might not come readily to 
First if those who say the decisions are "not going to have any 
effect at all" are correct, are correct in that the results of 
the land use process may not , but they are not correct in 
suggest the process to obtain those results will not change. 
There will be more disc 
better to support the 
the process, the record will be 
t, and, now that there are limits which 
may expose the c enti to mone damages, there should be 
more concern about test the line between a valid regulation and a 
taking. 
be much more ffi 
opportunities and the map is 
densities, has there been a 
to initiate reformation of obsolete 
property owners come forward with 
situation which comes to mind is the 
Act which requires maximizing 
the ivision. (1) However, in 
ies there is to be no diminution of 
of the tentative map is initially 
a tentative map maximizing solar 
at less than the maximum 
" of those lots deleted from the 
no answer absent a lot of other facts, but 
conflicting policies which justify the 
Second, the land use process 
observed that "pressure from 
One source of 
want the pro 
conditions in 
be more difficult for 
pressure in the absence of 
is a political process. It has been 
all sides a politician 
pressure comes from project 
t killed or, at worst, approved with 
the icant will abandon the project. 
elected officials to cater to that 
conditions unrelated to 
to deny the project or to 
the problems which would 
satisfy the opponents would, 
to a lawsuit and the 
In the 
ec 
Senate Local Government Committee 
August 13, 1987 
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Court Decisions Effect on Land Use Regulations 
invalidation of the unlawful action. Now, to satisfy the opponents 
the elective officials may be opening their city or county to a 
taking claim during the time the unlawful action is in place. 
This uncertainty as to the limits of denial or conditions may temper 
the elected officials' response to project opponents. It is the loss 
of this "anything goes" attitude by project opponents which may be 
the real reason for the outcry against these decisions by those who, 
in the name of the "public interest", are, in reality, just against 
the project. 
Third, cities and counties may welcome pre-election challenges to 
land use initiatives. 
If a pre-election challenge invalidates the initiative then they 
won t taking claims from those land owners adversely 
affected during the time the initiative would have been in effect. A 
successful pre-election challenge would avoid those taking claims. 
counties may find it more risky to blunt the effect of an 
technique of putting on the ballot an alternative 
tiative. The risk, other than the ploy may not work, is 
ternative to avoid potential taking issues while 
ng its itical attractiveness as an alternative to the 
initiative. 
Another reason a pre-election challenge might be welcome by a city or 
is to avoid temporary taking claims between the passage of an 
initiative and the repairs made to the land use policies affected by 
the i tiative. This could occur where the initiative is what I call 
"the ete general plan initiative." This is the initiative 
makes a general plan change without regard to the plan as a 
whole and thereby creates an internal inconsistency in the general 
plan which is prohi ted by law. (2) During the time there is an 
inconsistency in the general plan, certain land use decisions are 
forbidden. (3) The initiative created the circumstances which puts a 
temporary halt to land use actions, or a kind of moratorium. That 
moratorium and implications of a temporary taking could be avoided by 
a successful pre-election challenge to the incomplete general plan 
initiative. 
Senate Local Government Committee 
August 13, 1987 
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Court Dec ions Effect on Land Use Regulations 
Fourth, a most encouraging part of the Nollan decision is the signal 
of another reversal(4) of California judicial doctrine -- that 
development is a privilege, not a right. This has given rise to the 
notion that the conditions imposed in return for the development 
approval are almost limitless. This judicial doctrine no doubt is 
the biggest contributor to the phrase the "vanishing fee" to describe 
the loss of property owners' rights in the state. 
This change in California law derives from footnote 2 in the Nollan 
decision. The pertinent part reads as follows: 
But the right to build on one's own property-- even though 
its exercise can be subjected to legitimate permitting 
requirements -- cannot remo y be described as a "government 
benefit." And thus the announcement that the application for 
(or granting of) the permit 11 entail the yielding of a 
property interest cannot be regarded as establishing the 
voluntary "exchange" that we found to have occurred in 
Monsanto. 
ly occurs th footnote pronouncements in Supreme Court 
, their significance shows up a later opinion. If this 
ignored by those who want to retain the upper hand this 
court-made doctrine has given them in the past, the landowners 
U.S. Supreme Court in a future case to establish 
in state decis 
1) Government Code Section 66473.1 
(2) Government Code Section 65300.5 
3) Government Code Sections 65860 and 66474 (a) 
(4) First English Church changed the Agins remedy for an unlawful 
land use regulation from invalidation to compensation for the time 
the ion was in effect. 
Don V. Collin 
Mr. Chairman: 
- 111 -
STATEMENT OF THE CALIFORNIA CHAMBER OF COMMERCE 
BEFORE THE SENATE LOCAL GOVERNMENT COMMITTEE 
CALIFORNIA STATE SENATE 
"THE LIMITS CF LAND USE REGULATIONS" 
THE HONORABLE MARIAN BERGESON, CHAIRMAN 
August 13, 1987 
My name is Christian W.H. Solinsky. I am the Resources Director of the 
California Chamber of Commerce. The California Chamber is a voluntary business 
organization with over 3,500 members, 160 trade associations and some 400 
affiliated local chambers in California. 
We appreciate this opportunity to comment on the two recent decisions of 
the U.S. Supreme Court on property rights, Nollan v. California Coastal Commission 
and First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles. 
My comments will just address the legislative repercussions of the First English 
Church case which reversed a decision of the California Supreme Court of Agins v. 
City of Tiburon, 24 Cal 3rd 266 (1979). The Agins decision had for all practical 
purposes eliminated the use of "inverse condemnation" for legal claims that a 
land use regulation was excessive and deprived the property owner of any ~easonable 
economic use of the land. The California Supreme Court ruled the agreived property 
owner must first file an action to invalidate the ordinance and compensation was 
not available for the inability to use the property while the regulation was in 
effect. 
The U.S. Supreme Court in First English Church decided the "just compensation" 
clause of the Fifth Amendment allows the landowner to claim the property has in 
effect been taken by excessive land use regulation and allows the property owner 
Lu receive compensation for this "inverse condemnation" even if the taking is for 
a short period of time, such as interim or temporary ordinances or until the 
Presented by C.W.H. Solinsky, Resources Director of the California Chamber of 
Commerce in Sacramento, CA on August 13, 1987. 
ordinance is invalidated. - 112 -
The California Chamber of Commerce for a number of years since the Agins 
decision and its cases in California Court system has supported 
cause of action as a remedy for excessive land use regulatory policies of 
government. In the last session of the Legislature, Senator John Seymour 
introduced SB 1833 and the Senate Committee identified the following 
"key" issue in the bill: SHOULD PROPERTY OWNERS BE ENTITLED BY STATUTE TO 
INTERIM DAMAGES fOR THE EXERCISE Of A REGULATING POWER BY A PUBLIC ENTITY WHICH 
IS OCTERMINEO TO BE A "TAKING?" Even though representatives of the League of 
California Cities and other governmental agencies were involved in extensive 
negotiations on the bill, it did not pass the Legislature. All parties recognise 
that the Agins decision was not satisfactory to the extent that parties with an 
excessive land use regulation claim were excluded from using the Calfornia Court 
System to obtain compensation. 
What First ly is an affirmative answer to that 
"key" question in the Analysis -- that property owners will 
be entitled to compensation for excessive regulations even if they are temporary 
in nature. We submit that all levels of government in California need a method 
to process compensation claims at the expense to the taxpayers. One of 
the methods to carry out the First ish Church decision and to possibly limit 
--------~-----------
the liability of for compensation for excessive land use regulation 
is to allow property owners to protest the excessive regulation but proceed with 
construction of their project during the time when the court is asked to 
adjudicate the protest of whether the ation is excessive or not. 
For several years now the California Chamber has supported and sponsored 
legislation to allow landowners to excessive land use exactions and 
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development fees and go forward with construction of the project while the 
protest is litigated. 
The Legislature has enacted at least three statutes allowing a protest of 
excessive exactions imposed by local agencies (See Government Code Sections 
65913.5, 65958, and 66475.4). This year Assembly Member Elihu Harris introduced 
AB 1915 which proposes that the protest procedure for excessive exactions and 
development fees be extended to state agencies that issue land use permits. 
When the bill was introduced at the request of the Chamber the purpose was to 
allow the landowner to put the property into productive use and set aside for 
later court resolution any dispute over the amount of land, money, or other 
exactions that must be given to the government as a condition for obtaining 
the building permit. 
The bill has been structured in a way that guarantees the government agency 
will receive the benefit of every exaction condition if and when the protest 
unsuccessful. The government may actually receive a performance bond or 
L Lle lo lhe land in ion before the protest process can be used. The govern-
mcnt may also make fi that the exaction conditions are so necessary for the 
c health, safety or welfare that the entire protest procedure can be set 
aside and the approval of the building permit suspended pending resolution of 
the protested condition. 
Since the First English Church decision we believe state agencies should 
support the proposed protest procedure in AB 1915 as a method of reducing the 
state's liabil to landowners for excessive regulation claims. AB 1915 will 
be heard in Senate Natural Resources and Wildlife Committee next Monday, August 17, 
1987. The reason AB 1915 will reduce the liability of governments for inverse 
condemnation is the property owner will be making some productive use of the 
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land during the lit ion over whether or not the exaction condition is 
excessive. In most situations the d allow sufficient 
cc~~omic use of the land to make the First ish Church compensation 
--------~-----------
standards inapplicable. 
One other point we would like to make in closing is it might be useful 
for your committee to review the statutes for protesting local government 
Px8rtions to make sure the ation which was passed in recent years is 
adequate in light of _F_i_r_s_t __ ~~i_s_h __ C_h_u_r_c_h. 
We thank you for allowing us to testify today and I would be happy to 
answer any questions. 
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Report to the Senate Local Government Committee 
SUBJECT: Impact of U.S. Supreme Court Decision in First English and 
Nollan 
Presented by Brent Harrington on behalf of the California County 
Planning Directors Association 
Presented August ~3, 1987 
Good afternoon 
My name is Brent Harrington. I'm currently Planning Director for 
Calaveras County, but today I am representing the California County 
Planning Directors Association. Our Association, which represents the 
58 County Planning Directors of California is vitally interested 
in the impact of the U.S. Supreme Court's recent decisions regarding 
the First English and Nollan cases. We met as an organization last 
month to discuss the implications of these two cases, and our organi-
zation's response to them. After considerable deliberation, we would 
like to our comments at this time. 
Our purpose in speaking today is to give a general overview of the 
cases and how they affect decisions that we are involved with on a 
daily basis. Our purpose is neither to recite chapter and verse of 
the cases nor to restate the facts of the cases. We leave that 
ana to the many other speakers we're certain you'll hear today. 
Instead d to discuss the reaction to the cases and how that 
Plans and the land use decision making 
level. 
Planning Directors Association summarizes its 
points, as follows: 
1 while any Supreme Court decision regarding 
, the two recent cases will not generate the 
in land use planning that some would have us 
cases not create fundamental changes in 
has been practiced in all counties. In parti-
said that to not allow any use of land is a 
s concept has been long understood by land use 
planners and was not a new revelation. Nollan may have greater 
due to some of the unanswered questions that it 
Court's conclusion that there must be a solid 
reasoning between a land use problem and the 
to correct the problem is commonly understood by 
The ability of a jurisdiction to impose 
on new development to mitigate needs and 
by development is unchanged. In sum, the 
First English and Nollan cases are important, but do not 
change the basic concepts of land use planning in California. 
2. is a significant need to educate all concerned parties 
implications of these cases. There has been much 
made popular press about the implications of these deci-
sions. 
numerous 
tal groups and 
these cases mean. 
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of most newspapers and 
Many early news 
erroneous interpretations of the 
some parties that these 
the land use planning process. 
have received 
owners, developers, environmen-
associations asking or asserting what 
have raised at public hearings, 
and our respective Boards and Planning Commissions are searching 
for answers. We are 
be as important as 
cause for apprehens 
need to reach a we 
these decisions, 
all concerned 
cases themselves may not 
reaction they may 
decision makers. Clearly, there is a 
conclusion on the implications of 
ly disseminate that information to 
3. We do expect a significantly 
4. 
increased numbers cases resulting from First English and 
Nollan. Our that most experienced land 
use attorneys rea ze two cases are not as significant 
as some parties may want lieve. Whi we may not like it, 
we do realize that more court and expense will be needed 
to better def the of First English and Nollan. 
We do hope that parties, good land use decisions 
will be made, and frivolous cases, which will cost 
local government s money to defend, will be 
prevented. 
The 
in 
Zoning 
mental 
alters 
those dec 
supporting 
English 
confirm the need to ensure 
1 and well reasoned 
court was trying to 
makers we must carefully 
implications. Sound 
this , with the need 
public land use 
national leader 
as the General Plan and 
California Environ-
recent Court decisions 
tools. Yes, we must 
our decisions, and 
upon proper findings and sufficient 
concepts were sound before First 
11 be sound for a very long time. 
I want to end my comments on 
that we appreciate Local 
our organization by stating 
Government Committee's keen and swift 
interest in these 
look to you 
have named 
publish its 
would great 
Our organi-z 
to speak to you. We 
point to address the points we 
to recommend that this Committee 
from these deliberations, which 
process relative to these cases. 
participate in your delibera-
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tions and followup action, and we offer our services to you as you see 
fit. 
Are there any questions? 
Submitted by Brent Harrington representing The California County Planning 
Directors Association 
CONTACT: Brent Harrington 
Calaveras County 
Planning Department 
891 Mountain Ranch Rd. 
San Andreas, CA. 95249 
(209) 754-3841 
George Robson, President CCPDA 
% Tehama County Planning Department 
Courthouse Annex, Rm I 
Red Bluff, CA. 96080 
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lf of the League of California Cities, I 
to assist the Committee with understanding 
these important land use decisions from the 
of local government. 
Attached hereto are responses to the specific 
t you have posed (tab 1), my paper on the three 
major land use decisions decided by the Supreme Court this 
term ( 2), an outline for analyzing takings claims (tab 
3), my statement of qualifications (tab 4). 
At this time there are some procedural areas where 
legislation might be helpful in expeditiously resolving the 
uncertainties caused by the Supreme Court's decisions in 
and Nollan. 
1. Legislation clarifying that administrative and 
traditional mandamus are the appropriate state forums for 
resolving disputes over land use regulations in the first 
Marian Bergeson 
Chairman and Members of 
Senate Committee on 
Local Government 
August 13, 1987 
Page 2 
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instance and that a timely action in mandate (or possibly 
declaratory relief) is a prerequisite to an action for just 
compensation. 
2. Administrative and court procedures to ensure 
that the public agency defendant is able to insure early 
resolution of the issues. 
3. Short statutes of limitations for just compen-
sation claims. 
KES/cdh 
Encls. 
cc: Connie H. Barker 
Peter Detweiler 
Katherine E. Stone 
Of Burke, Williams & Sorensen 
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RESPONSES TO PREPARED QUESTIONS 
QUESTION 1. Early press reports characterized the First 
Lutheran Church and Nollan decisions as signalling a major 
change in land use law. Do you agree? 
RESPONSE: No. Neither First Lutheran Church nor Nollan 
changed established land use rules. The United States 
Supreme Court reaffirmed these rules in another case this 
term, Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v. De 
Benedictis. In Keystone the Court upheld a regulation 
almost identical to the one struck down sixty-five years ago 
in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, where Chief Justice 
Oliver Wendell Holmes invoked a constitutional debate by 
stating: "If a regulation goes too far it will be 
recognized as a taking." The Court held just that in First 
Lutheran, but did not decide what is "too far," when a 
taking would start, or the measure of damages for a 
temporary taking. However, the Supreme Court's decision did 
end the debate in the federal courts. The result will be to 
shift the cases back to the state courts to decide what 
constitutes a taking under state law. This will mean 
changes in trial tactics. 
In Nollan, the Court held that a land dedication 
imposed as a condition of development must relate to the 
Tab 
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s s caus nt t d not decide 
how close the r ti ip must be. 
In both Nol and First Lutheran the Court 
---
reaffirmed prior cases inc i Agins v. Tiburon upholding 
land use regu tions a wi variety of purposes and 
which, in some cases, severe impact land values. For a 
more complete analysis of this question, see my paper 
entitled, "Has the Supreme Court Cast an Instant Pall on 
Land Use Controls?", which is attached under tab-2. 
QUESTION ~ 
practices? 
How will these cases change public officials' 
RESPONSE: As a practical matter, First Lutheran will 
y a il i effect on some public agencies' 
land use practices. Deve r attorneys may threaten large 
damage suits 
rsonal li 
e r r or s • Sma 1 
from maki 
es t ing officials may be 
for 1 manner of land use planning 
r cities with 1 budgets may shy away 
use isions. Individual officials 
fear personal monetary ruin. 
r 
have not 
a. can 1 t they do now that they used to 
No i 
remedy. 
The substantive rules 
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b. Will these cases slow down land use 
decisions as public officials become more cautious about 
lawsuits? 
Response: They could. Especially as lawyers 
inevitably become more involved in planning and planners 
attempt to interpret and predict the law. 
c. Some suggest that local officials will be 
more reluctant to amend general plans to designate more land 
for development until it is clear that the project is ready 
to begin. They fear that early planning will give rise to 
later taking questions. Do you agree? 
Response: This effect on local officials is 
an unfortunate possibility. Although California law is now 
clear that early planning does not give rise to a property 
right which can be "taken", this "vested rights" rule is 
strongly criticized by developers and could be changed by 
the new State Supreme Court. Some city planners are 
considering avoiding up-zoning property for development and 
instead generally indicating that the area may be designated 
for development in the future. As a matter of good planning 
procedures it is preferable that land use policies be 
established early in the process. 
d. Will officials change their practices 
regarding access to navigable waterways, particularly in the 
Delta, at Lake Tahoe, and along the coast? 
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public officials may do 
so, the Nollan decision on access should be pretty much 
limited to its facts--the impacts of replacement of a small 
single family home with a larger home. The impacts of 
larger developments of unimproved lands bordering navigable 
waterways on access to such public trust lands should not be 
difficult to show. 
QUESTION l.!_ California's 80 charter cities have 
constitutional authority over their "municipal affairs." 
Will either of these cases affect charter cities differently 
than they affect counties ral law cities? 
RESPONSE: No. The cases involve limits imposed by the 
United States Constitution, i applies equally to both 
charter and general law cities and counties. It is 
important, however, to note that not every planning error 
will rise to a c under the constitution. Delays 
occasioned by v ing requirements imposed by 
statute (e.g., ral plan consistency} would not amount to 
a taking under the Fifth Amendment. 
QUESTION 4. In First Lutheran Church, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist said that the Court was not deciding "whether the 
county might avoid cone sion that a compensable taking 
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had occurred by establishing that the denial of all use was 
insulated as a part of the State's authority to enact safety 
regulations." California law often justifies regulations in 
the name of public health, safety, and welfare but Rehnquist 
only mentioned "safety." Does this suggest that health or 
welfare consicerations may not be sufficient to justify 
regulations that deny all use of property? Is public safety 
the only acceptable justification? 
RESPONSE: Justice Rehnquist may have only referred to 
"safety" regulations because the facts of First Lutheran 
give rise to safety concerns (a fire and flood with the loss 
of 10 lives}. Certainly public safety can justify severe 
land use regulations. However, the cases cited by Justice 
Rehnquist for this point were not limited to public safety 
justification, but instead, involved nuisance-like 
ac ivities and an analysis similar to Justice Stevens' 
nion in Keystone. 
ION 5. Government Code §65858 sets out the 
p res that counties and most cities must follow when 
ing temporary zoning moratoria. The Legislature 
the current section in 1982 and it will "sunset 11 on 
January 1, 1989 unless reauthorized. The earlier version of 
the section will then apply. 
26 -
a. Does the cur ent language avoid the kind 
of t rary r latory t i 
Church? 
Response: I 
suggest some precautionary 
discussed in First Lutheran 
ink so. More analysis may 
ts. Temporary zoning 
moratoria should not give rise to a taking claim in any 
event because they do not purport to deprive a landowner of 
all use for a tantial r of time and because a claim 
ordinari wou not become ripe under Williamson County 
Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 450 U.S. 172 
(1985) within the moratorium period. 
language? 
the is 
rvisors 
wel re 
is not 
b. he islature renew the current 
I ink so. 
c. Are rt r nts needed? Should 
ture r ire cit councils and county boards of 
to tter fine ic health, safety, or 
itions t moratorium is meant to resolve? 
nexus required by Nollan 
tantially different from that which local 
governments are accustomed. The substance and nature of 
these findings be left to the local governments which 
are 1 r wi the circumstances 
necessitating the moratorium. 
d 
statutes to conform 
re 
ION 6. Courts tr i i 
=------
set elected l is tures. 
ordinances, or local initiat 
safety, or welfare problems 
tions, ll t infl 
F rst Lut ran Chur 
r 
It WOU 
on detail l is 
's actions o arr 
reat to t 
er in 
common 1 
i leal 1 islat 
justificat on. 
local evel e 
regulation is des 
fare 
cited with 
rst Lutheran, 
e 
other 
ich ones? 
to fully 
t policies 
es, local 
ic health, 
r new 
ts will apply 
one the Court -~~~-~;;...__.;:.. 
rred to the 
ived to be a 
ix five years 
rt held that 
t public 
at both the 
nee courts 
ic health, 
Agins v. 
in both Nollan 
on 
eems to scrutinize land use 
r ions more c It is usually easier to explain 
and justify legislation that recites the reasons why it was 
enacted. 
a. 
statutory findings 
11 landowners pay more attention to 
declarations of legislative intent? 
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Response: I don't know. 
b. Will local officials ask the Legislature 
to strengthen the statements of legislative intent in 
statutes that permit local regulations? 
Response: Perhaps. 
c. Will drafters of local initiatives and 
referenda strengthen their statements of intent to immunize 
them from possible legal challenges? 
Response: Findings are not required in 
initiatives even where otherwise required by statute. (BIA 
v. Camarillo (1986) 41 Cal.3d 810.) Statements of intent 
are helpful to show what information was before the 
electorate. Proponents of initiatives may lack the 
sophistication to draft detailed findings and City Councils 
cannot change an initiative before putting it on the 
ballot. The Supreme Court in BIA v. Camarillo had 
difficulty with the concept of findings being made before 
the measure had been submitted to the electorate. 
QUESTION ~ Under First Lutheran Church, when does a 
temporary regulatory taking start? 
RESPONSE: Justice Rehnquist did not say, but stated: 
"We do not deal with the quite different 
questions that would arise in the case of 
Just a 
z 
the li e, 
r , in 
Inc., Justice 
--------~------
stat II city must all 
t with sol tions to 
Prev ously, n 
Hamilton Court 
30 -
a n ldi ts 
ordinances a variances 
are not before use. 11 
ist writing for the majority 
a reasonable opportunity to 
ttedly serious problems." 
t t even an eight-year 
ication process did not present a "ripe" taki claim. 
Before a r taki 
must r y r a 
lication." 
t rt r ir 
i r t 
a 
s ish twee 
ocess 
taki it 
taki If a 
unit r 5 acres 
issue 
How can 
norma 
d presented land owner 
e a "meaning 1 
r to seek a variance before 
rs and lie officials 
nd t 
tory taki s? 
itself doesn't lead to 
ion of all use that is the 
some reasonable use (e.g., 1 
~~--------------
)) then there is no taking 
a de s while r seeks a higher use are not 
compensable. If the r tion denies the landowner all 
use wit t justification, then the taking would appear to 
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start when the regulation is "applied" to the land. In 
First Lutheran the court indicated that a permanent 
deprivation of all use might be justified for safety 
reasons. A temporary deprivation for welfare reasons, such 
as general plan revisions would also be justified. In any 
event, the landowner would normally be required to seek 
administrative relief before the claim would be ripe or 
considered "applied." 
b. Is state legislation needed to define 
when a temporary regulatory taking starts? Or should this 
issue be left to the courts to interpret? 
Response: Legislation is not needed. The 
courts will decide the constitutional issue in any event. 
c. Is state legislation needed to guide the 
courts in how to calculate a landowner's loss which occurs 
during a temporary regulatory taking? 
Response: No. The loss protected by the 
constitution is a judicial determination which cannot be 
limited by legislation. It is important to distinguish 
temporary takings of all use from permanent takings and 
temporary takings which affect title, physical integrity or 
some other vested interest. Eminent domain law is not 
necessarily relevant to valuation of temporary takings by 
overregulation because a landowner generally does not have a 
vested right or reasonable expectation in a particular use. 
- 132 -
QUESTION 2..:_ If a state regulation is found to be a 
temporary regulatory taking, what is the State General 
Fund's exposure? 
RESPONSE: It may be exposed. 
a. If a local regulation, adopted to 
implement state law, is found to be a temporary regulatory 
taking, what is the State General Fund's exposure? 
Response: Under the state constitution as 
interpreted in the County of Los Angeles case, the State is 
required to provide reimbursement if the State imposes a 
mandate which applies uniquely to local government. 
Therefore if a local government is directly or indirectly 
required to adopt a regulation which is found to constitute 
a taking. The State must fully reimburse the local 
government. 
b. What is the process for recovering 
damages? 
Response: The State should be a necessary 
party to suits involving state mandated programs. 
QUESTION 10. Will Nollan influence the current debate over 
charging fees for off-site improvements? In particular, 
what about school developer fees? 
--
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RESPONSE: Nollan may require a higher scrutiny in local 
dedication situations; this same scrutiny would not seem to 
apply to development fees. The nexus required by Nollan 
does not seem to be more stringent than the familiar 
Associated Homebuilders v. Walnut Creek test. 
QUESTION 11. The traditional test of levying benefit 
assessments is that landowners must pay in proportion to the 
benefit conferred on their property by the facility or 
service being financed. 
a. Is the "nexus'' discussed in Nollan any 
different? 
Response: The nexus discussed in Nollan is 
less direct than that required of benefit assessments. 
Nollan says the exaction must relate to the same impacts 
caused in the development; i.e., if the development will 
cause more traffic, an off-site road widening condition may 
be appropriate, but not off-site low income housing. Under 
Nollan the exaction need not be related to any special 
benefit conferred or proportionally related to the impact. 
b. What can landowners and land use 
regulators learn from assessment practices that will help 
them find this nexus? 
Response: The type of engineering analysis 
used for benefit assessments is a conservative way to 
analyze 
measures. 
t impacts 
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appropriate mitigation 
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HAS THE SUPREME COURT CAST AN INSTANT 
PALL ON LAND USE CONTROL? 
By 
Katherine E. Stone 
of 
Burke, Williams & Sorensen 
To Be Presented at 
State Bar Conference 
Los Angeles 
September 1987 
HAS THE 
PALL ON 
By Katherine E. Stone 
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AN INSTANT 
CONTROLS? 
THE SUPREME COURT'S RECENT DECISIONS 
SHOULD NOT INHIBIT REASONABLE LAND USE 
REGULATION. 
The editors of the Los Angeles Times characterized 
the Supreme Court's decision in First English Evangell7al 
Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles -
("First Lutheran Church") that the constitution requires 
just compensation for overregulation, as casting an "instant 
pall on state and local land use controls at a time when 
such controls are critical to ts~ orderly development and 
protection of the environment."-/ The Times editorial 
worries that planning ncies may be paralyzed by fear of 
facing huge monetar j nts and suggests that the 
validity of routine regulations may be put in doubt 
b¥ the Sup~e~e C~qrt's Other newspapers echoed the 
T1mes pess1m1sm.-/ 
Deve rs' attor j~bilantly pronounced Nollan 
v. California Coastal Commission-/ the death knell to the 
ogram and predicted an end to 
permits. 
In contrast to these two well publicized opinions, 
a thi by the Supreme Court this term 
In Ke~~tone Bituminous Coal 
ctis,=f ("Keystone Coal") the court 
--:---::-...-------::---:-..,.------,::----:---.- i ca 1 to the one s t ruck down 
in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon§/, 
where Chief Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. invoked a 
constitutional te stating "If regulation goes too far 
it will be recognized as a taking". 
i te 
of state and l rnment 7q 
for health, safety and welfare-/ 
compensation c e fif 
tted the reserved power 
exercise the police power 
against the just 
amendment to the United 
t sixty-five years States Constitution. For the 
government lawyers have arg that a sufficient remedy for 
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a land use regulation that goes too far is invalidation of 
the regulation under the due process clause of the 
Constitution. First Lutheran Church has settled that 
debate. Developer and landowner attorneys have now 
persuaded a majority of the court that just compensation is 
required by the fifth amendment for even a temporary taking. 
While the constitutional debate has ended, the high 
court's opinions this term do not in any way suggest that 
reasonable land use regulations will subject local 
government to damages or that government should refrain from 
conditioning development on the provision of land 
dedications, impact fees, and other exactions. 
On the contrary, government may still proh~bit 
citizens from raising livestock in their backyards,_/ 
prohib~t citi~ens from.running ?u~iness7s in residential 
areas,_/ requ1re exact1ons to m1t1gate 1mpacts of 
development and put a temporary hold on dey0lopment. The court's prior decision in Agins v. Tiburon--/ limiting a 
developer to one house for every one, two or five acres was 
not overruled, but affirmed in First Lutheran Churi~/and 
Nollan. Government may still prohibit at~;use of, __ or 
even destroy property that is dangerous.-- But if a 
regulation denies a landowner all use of his or her property 
without valid justification, or if a dedication condition is 
not reasonably related to the impacts caused by the 
development, the government may be required to pay 
compensation. 
The Ruling In First Lutheran Church Is No Big 
Surprise. 
It is not surprising that the United States Supreme 
Court ~~& ruled that the fifth amendment just compensation 
clause--/ of the United States Constitution obligates the 
payment of interim damages if a government regulation 
amounts to a temporary ing of rty. Before 1971 
when the California Supreme Court in Agins v. Tiburon _!; 
held that "inverse condemnation is an inappropriate and 
undesirable remedy in cases in which unconstitutional 
regulation is alleged," most government lawyers assumed 
damages might be awarded in a proper case. Since at least 
1981, when five justices the United State! Supreme Court 
in San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. San Diego-2/ indicated 
compensation might be constitutionally required and Justice 
Brennan stated "(a]fter all, if a poli£gman must know the 
Constitution then why not a planner?,"-/ we have been 
expecting a ruling to that effect from the high court. 17/ 
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t is su risi is t vehicle the court chose 
to make its pronouncement--a case where the regulation 
appears to be clear justified on its face. In First 
Lutheran Church, ief tice Rehnquist, joined by Justices 
Brennan, White, Marshall, Powell and Scalia, reached the 
remedy without fi i a r · The Court expressly did not 
decide whether Los Angeles County's interim flood ordinance 
(enacted as an urgency measure after a fire and flash flood 
destroyed a camp for i children) actually denied 
the church "all use of its property or whether the county 
might avoid the cone ion that a compensable taking had 
occurred by establishing that the denial of all use was 
insulated as a gart of the State's authority to enact safety 
regulations. 11~7 As stated by Justice Stevens, dissenting: 
"[I]t is imperative to stress that the 
court does not ho that appellant is 
entitled to compensation as a result of 
the flood protection regulation that the 
county enacted No matter whether the 
regulation is treated as one that 
deprives appellant of its property on a 
permanent or t rary basis, the court's 
precedents demonstrate the type of 
regulatory ram at ~qsue here cannot 
constitute a taki . !_; 
The issue deci the Supreme Court in First 
Lu ran Church is very narrow: 
"Where the government's activities have 
alr wor a taki of all use of 
property, no equent action by the 
government can relieve it of the duty to 
prov t for the period 
during ich ing was effective.". 
(Emphasis added). 
It is apparent that Chief Justice Rehnquist was 
frustrated with the Court's repeated failure to reach the 
taking question. Four t in the last six years, after 
assuming jurisdict , t Court ruled that either the 
regulat~£n did not constitute a taking, as in Agins v. 
Tiburon--/, or that l disputes might still lead to the 
conclusion that no ing o~~urred, as in MacDonald, 
Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County,_·_ Williamson County Regional 
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Planning Comm'n. v. Hamilt~~,Bank~/ and San Diego Gas & 
Electric Co. v. San Diego.--/ 
This term the Court accepted three cases where a 
taking was claimed: First Lutheran Church, Nollan and 
Keystone Coal. As none of the cases presented facts 
sufficient to actually constitute a compensable taking, the 
Chief Justice had to decide 25he remedy in a vacuum, or 
"leave it for another day."-/ 
Curiously, the Court selected from the three 
potential taking cases before it this term the case which 
most observers viewed as the least likely to constitute a 
taking. First Lutheran Church involved a challenge to Los 
Angeles County's interim flood ordinance adopted as an 
urgency measure after a devastating flood destroyed lives 
and property, including a retreat and a camp for handicapped 
children owned by the First Lutheran Church. The camp was 
situated along Mill Creek, a natural drainage channel in Los 
Angeles County. Only the low lying portion of the Church's 
property was affected by the ordinance. 
The majority of the Court in First Lutheran Church 
limited its discussion and its holding to the remedy 
available if a temporary taking is found. The Court 
specifically did not address whether the ordinance in 
question actually effected a taking. Nor did it alter the 
tests generally employed by the Court for determining 
whether a taking has occurred. 
Chief Justice Rehnquist emphasized that for 
purposes of his opinion only, the court assumed that the 
moratorium had deprived the church all use of its 
property for a considerable period of time. He also 
emphasized that even if this were true, compensation would 
not be r2~4ired if the regulation was justified for safety 
reasons.--/ As examples of such justification, the Chief 
Justice referred to cases upholding the exercise of the 
police power prohibiting ex~'Jations below two feet above 
maximum1ground water level~07 bri yards in certain areas-~-8 and a distillery.~! 
Justice Rehnquist repeatedly emphasized his 
assumption that the church was deprived of all use of its 
property, and did not suggest that something less would 
amount to a taking. Significantly, the court stated that 
the regulation in Agins, where property was dow~~qned to 1-5 
units per five acres "did not effect a taking."-/ 
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S nee at east 1926 y~en the Supreme Court decided 
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,l-1 it has been established that 
(l) a regulatory pr ram does not constitute a taking unless 
it destroys all reasonable use of the property; (2) state 
law defines property rights; and (3) government may, in a 
proper exercise of its police power, substantially interfere 
with even vested property rights to prevent harm. The 
Court's decision in rst Lutheran Church does not change 
these established land use rules. 
The Nollan Case Did Not Significantly Alter 
Land Uses Rules 
In Nollan, a 5-4 decision authored by Justice 
Scalia, joined by Rehnquist, White, Powell and O'Connor, the 
Court held invalid as applied to the Nollan's property the 
Coastal Commission's requirement that a permit to build a 
new beachfront house conditioned on providing public 
access along that beach. Although the Court stated that in 
this circumstance, if the State wanted to provide for public 
access it would have to pay for it, there was no taking 
because the Nollans had built their house without complying 
with the condition. 
The Court rved t conditioning development on 
dedication of land is constitutional if the condition is 
designed to serve the same purposes for which the Commission 
could deny permit, t ruled: 
"The evident const tutional propriety 
disappears, however, if the condition 
substituted t prohibition utterly 
fails to fur r the end advanced as the 
justification for prohibition."E/ 
The Court r iz that the Commission's goal to 
ensure adequate lie access to the public tidelands was 
valid, but t there was an insufficient "nexus" 
between this e t condition imoosed. In other 
words, the Commission did not show that the new house would 
burden public access to beach. Nor did the evidence 
show that the dedicat condition would relieve the impacts 
the Commission advanced as justification for the 
condition. The Court did say, however, that assuming the 
Commission could have exercised its police power to deny the 
permit because of s caused by the development, alone 
or in conjunction with other similar developments, 
conditions re to those impacts such as height 
limitations, width restrictions, a ban on fences, or even 
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requiring a "viewing spot" on the ~~llan's property for 
passersby would be constitutional.--/ 
Like the decision in First Lutheran Church, the 
Court's holding in Nollan is narrow and reaffirmed tradi-
tional land use rules. The majority cited to the downzoning 
in Agins v. Tiburon as an example of a valid land use regu-
lation, as it had in First Lutheran Church. 
The practical effect of the Nollan decision is to 
require state and local governments to make clear findings 
that link conditions requiring dedications and other exac-
tions to the burdens caused by the development. 
The Court Reaffirmed Government Power 
To Control Land Use In Keystone Coal 
State and local governments' power to enact and 
enforce reasonable land use regulations without liability 
for damages was reaffirmed earlier this term in Keystone 
Coal. The case arose out of a challenge to a Pennsylvania 
statute which requires coal mine operators to leave a cer-
tain amount of coal in the ground to prevent land subsid-
ence. The Pennsylvania State Legislature based its decision 
to implement the support requirement on detailed findings 
that the legislation was important for the protection of 
public health and safety, preservation of ~ffected munici-
palities' tax bases and land development.l-1 
~~~ty-five years ago, in Pennsylvania Coal Company 
v. Mahon, __ / the Supreme Court held that a similar 
regulation was not properly justified. This time, however, 
in an opinion written by Justice Stevens a majority of the 
Court held that the regulation was a valid exercise of the 
police power and not a taking of property within the meaning 
of the fifth amendment taking clause. The Court held that 
the mine operators had not sustained their heavy burden of 
showing that the statute on its face effects a taking. The 
Court emphasized that the record showed that (1) the state 
had acted to arrest what it perceived to be a significant 
threat to the common welfare; and (2) the statute did not 
make it impossible for the mine operators to profitably 
engage in their business or unduly interfere with the 
operator's investment-backed expectations. 
The Court further held that the coal left in the 
ground is not a separate segment of property for purposes 
the taking clause, and that the requirement tha~ the coal 
left in place did not effect a physical taking.~/ 
of 
be 
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THE CASES INHIBIT REASONABLE LAND USE REGULATION 
Although as a practical matter the First Lutheran 
Church and the Nollan cases may temporarily have a chilling 
effect on local land use planning, the Supreme Court's 
opinions this term not in any way suggest that reasonable 
land use regulations will subject local government to 
damages. This is evide by the Keystone Coal decision, 
which applied the tradit 1 taking analysis and upheld the 
Pennsylvania statute, and the Nollan decision where the 
Court stated: 
"Our cases have not elaborated on the 
standards r determining what con-
stitutes a ' itimate state interest' or 
what type of connection between the regu-
lation and the state interest satisfies 
the requirement that the former 'sub-
stantially advance' the latter. They 
have made clear, however, that a broad 
range of governmental purposes and regu-
lations Sqtisfies these require-
ments. u1JJ 
The Court then cited as examples of valid ~~nd use regulatio~s ~~~es uphol<;Iing ~cenic ~oni28;3 I, landmark 
preservatlon--1 and resl tlal zonlng.--
Thus, although the Court's three "taking" decisions 
this term may result in closer judicial scrutiny of land use 
regulations, local government may continue to enact 
moratoriums, rezone property, prohibit development in 
setback areas and greenbelts, control growth, preserve 
historical landmarks, prevent noxious uses of property and 
require land dedications and other exactions to mitigate the 
impacts of development, so long as the regulation does not 
amount to a compensable "taking" under the traditional 
taking analysis. 
QUESTIONS LEFT UNANSWERED BY THE COURTS DECISIONS 
What Is A Taking? 
This term the Supreme Court did not add any new 
insights on what constitute a taking. The Court has 
often stated that there are no hard and fast rules for 
determining when a taking has occurred, and that such a 
decision must be made on an ad hoc, case-by-case basis.41/ 
In PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins-4-2/, the Court stated: 
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"It is well established that not every 
destruction or injury to property by 
governmental action has been held to be a 
taking in the constitutional sense. 
Rather, the determination whether state 
law unlawfully infringes on a landowner's 
property in violation of the taking 
clause requires an examination of whether 
the restriction on private property 
forces some people alone to bear public 
burdens which, in all fairness and 
justice, should be borne by the public as 
a whole." 
In Nollan, the majority relied on the Court's 
opinion in Agins v. Tiburon as expressing the test for a 
taking as follows: 
"A land use regulation does not effect a 
taking if it 'substantially advance[s] 
legitimate state interests' and does not 
'den[y] an owner economically viable use 
of his land', Agigj ,v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 
2 5 5 , 2 6 0 ( 19 8 0 ) • "_I 
In analyzing a taking claim the Court has tradi-
tionally focused on two primary factors. The first is the 
character of the state action. As a rule, it is more diffi-
cult to establi a taking when the interference with prop-
erty is characteriz~i1as regulatory as opposed to actual physical occupation-- , and harder still when the 
interference is necessary r th~ gromotion of the health 
and safety of the general public~7. The more substantial 
the public interest, the less likely it is that a taking 
will be found. Local entities have broad discretion to 
eliminate noxious uses of property, or uses which constitute 
a public nuisance, even if the exercise of such discretion 
substantially ~nterferes with an individual's use of his or 
her property.!_/ In First Lutheran Church, the Court 
recognized that even all use might be prohibited in a flood 
zone for safety reasons. 
The second primary factor is the i~~qct of the 
regulation on protected property interests.--/ In Keystone 
Coal, the Court noted that the statute did not make it 
impossible to engage in the coal mining business or unduly 
interfere with investment-backed expectations. When 
analyzing these kinds of factors it is important to remember 
that property interests are ~7reated and defined by state laws, not the Constitution.±- . 
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Any "taki " anal is should start with the 
questions: (1) what alleg property interest has been 
"taken"; and (2) is it a protected interest under California 
law? For example, in lifornia development is a privilege, 
not a right, and a developer cannot have a reasonable 
investment-backed expectation (a protected property 
interest) in a garticular development until he has gained a 
vested right.~7 
The right to develop a particular project generally 
does not vest until there has been substantial detriment in 
good fa~ 0n reliance on a validly issued building permit.--/ There is no right t~ q higher or even to the 
existing zoning classification._!/ It is not until a 
protected property right has been "taken" that the question 
of compensation arises, and before a landowner can claim a 
denial of ~11 use he must apply for a "reasonable use" of 
the land.~/ These well-established rules have not been 
affected by the Court's decision in First Lutheran Church or 
Nollan, and are reaffirmed in Keystone Coal. It is 
important to be aware, however, that ~~ghts may vest earlier pur~~qnt to a development agreement,~/ a vesting tentative 
map-s~;or automatic approval under the Permit Streamlining 
Act.-
If A Taking Has Occurred, When Did It 
Start? 
In First rch, Justice Rehnquist assumed 
that the county's had denied the church of all 
use of its property from the outset for a substantial period 
of time, and included litigation delays in the calculation. 
This is disturbing because litigation delays can be 
substantial, and such delays are often beyond the control of 
defendant government agencies. 
The inion did not explain when such delays might 
become a taking, but stated: 
"We . . • do not 1 with the quite 
different questions that would arise in 
the case of normal delays in obtaining 
building permits, changes in zoning 
ordinances, varianc5~1and the like, which are not before us. 11 -
--
-
-
-
-
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Just a 7~ar ago, in City of Renton v. Playtime 
Theatres, Inc.,2-l Justice Rehnquist writing for the 
majority stated "the city must be allowed a reasonable 
opportunity to experiment with solutions to admittedly 
serious problems." Previously, in William~~? County 
Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank,:= the Court held 
that even an eight-year application process did not present 
a "ripe" taking claim. Before a ripe taking issue could be 
presented the land owner must reapply for a development 
permit and make a "meaningful a~ilication." In MacDonald, 
Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County,_/ the Court required the 
developer to seek a variance before considering the taking 
claim. 
These cases show that what constitutes a 
substantial period of time in the view of the Supreme Court 
needs clarification. 
What Is Just Compensation? 
The Court only briefly discussed the question of 
the measure of damages for regulatory takings in First 
Lutheran Church. In its discussion, the Court relied on 
phys~cal taking cases arising out of the government's tem-
porary appropriation of private property during World War 
II. The Court noted that in these cases, the measure of 
damages was based on the value of the use of the land during 
the period of time the land was used by the government. 
"'It is the owner's loss, not the taker's gaig61which is the measure of the value of the property taken.'"-
Questions remain as to the standard for measuring 
the owner's loss, e.g., is it the minimum constitutional 
use? Other issues such as the owner's duty to mitigate, 
offsets for increases in value and many other well-
recognized rules for valuing property damage remain to be 
litigated. 
What Nexus Is Constitutionally Required 
For Development Conditions? 
The dedication condition in Nollan was held invalid 
because the ma~£7rity felt it "utterly fails to further the end advanced."- But the Court did not clarify what type 
of connection is constitutionally required. It has always 
been the rule in California and elsewhere that there must be 
a reasonable relationship between the development impacts 
and exactions. 
direct connection 
created 
48 -
llan argued that there must 
ition and the burdens 
Since Associated 
nut Creek, 3 California courts have 
be a 
held 
~~----~----~~~--~--------rec nexus s required. The Coastal 
"indirect nexus 11 
. ior 6 ~~ Nollan have all relied on this t:est.-
Although Court characterized the California 
rule as the nori position, it did not accept the plain-
tiff's proffered direct nexus test. Instead the majority 
us the terms "substantially advancing a legitimate ~~a,te 
interest" and "serves the same governmental purpose."-/ 
The majority also r iz t the cumulative impacts of 
s ~ar d~vel . ~s co~~~ be a legitimate government basis 
for 1mpos1ng exact:lons.--
Justice 
standard articu 
that there must 
ts of the 
Brennan, dissenting, interpreted the 
t by the majority to be the familiar rule 
a "reasonable relationship" between the 
t and the condition imposed. 
After erne Court's decision in Nollan, it is 
somewhat uncertain ecisely what sort of nexus will pass 
constitutional muster. As a practical matter, this is gen-
erally not a se statutes such as Government 
Code Section a close nexus for monetary exac-
tions of development approval. Exac-
t impos ivision Map Act also require a 
fairly close nexus. More exotic conditions are generally 
only imposed on larger developments as a result of negotia-
tions. 
CONCLUSION 
States reme Court has held 
t tion 
certain circumstances, 
ired for a regulatory taking in 
lower federal courts and the 
Cali r court 
regulation on its 
and to date no 
over-r lation o 
sel found that a local land use 
or as applied constitutes a taking, 
llate court has awarded compensation for 
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August 13, 1987 
When Has City Regulatory Action Gone Too Far: 
What Is A Taking? 
Peter M. Thorson 
Benjamin Kaufman 
Margaret A. Sohagi 
A land use regulation is not a taking if: 
1. The regulation substantially advances a 
legitimate governmental interest; 
and 
2. The regulation does not deny claimant 
economically viable use of his land. 
(Nollan v. California Coastal 
Comm1ssion, No. 86-133, slip 
opin1on at page 8 (June 26, 
1987); Keystone Bituminous 
Coal Assn. v. DeBenedictis, 
480 U.S. , , 94 L.Ed.2d 
472, 488 (1987~Agins v. 
Tiburon, 447 u.s. 255, 260 
(1980).) 
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When Has City Regulatory 
Action Gone Too Far: 
What Is A Taking? 
1. Does the regulation substantially advance a 
legitimate governmental interest? 
{a) What is the identified governmental interest 
behind the regulation? 
(b) How important is the identified state 
interest: Is it health and safety related, or 
just related to the general welfare? For 
permits, is the identified governmental purpose 
sufficient to justify denial of the application? 
(c) Does the project or the activity sought to be 
regulated impose a burden on the identified 
governmental interest? 
(i) Direct 
(ii) Indirect/cumulative 
(d) Does the regulation alleviate the burden imposed 
on the identified state interest? 
(e) To what extent does the regulation single out 
the project to bear a disproportionate share of 
the burden? 
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When Has City Regulatory 
Action Gone Too Far: 
What Is A Taking? 
2. Does the regulation deny claimant economically viable 
use of his land? 
Looking at the specific facts on a case by case basis, 
consider the following factors: 
(a} Economic impact of the regulation 
Bundle of sticks remaining 
Parcel as a whole 
(b) Interference with reasonable investment-backed 
expectations 
- No reasonable expectation of a zoning 
classification unless a vested right. 
(c) Character of the governmental action. 
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ALAN R. PENDLETON 
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR 
SAN FRANCISCO BAY CONSERVATION AND DEVELOPMENT COMMISSION 
before the 
CALIFORNIA SENATE COMMITTEE ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
MARIAN BERGESON, CHAIRMAN 
at the 
Hearing on the Limits of Land Use Regulation 
Sacramento, California 
August 13, 1987 
You have asked me to present my views on how the u.s. Supreme Court's 
recent 1/ First Lutheran- and Noll decisions will affect land use 
regu ion and, particular , the atory program of the San Francisco Bay 
Conse vation and Commission. I believe the committee and land use 
reg ators oug 1 b , d , 131 h 1 a so to e as 1ntereste 10 Keystone Coa - , t e much ess 
discussed case that was also decided this term so I will also refer to the 
essons that case has to teach us as we 1. Although the Commission has been 
bri ed these cases the Attorney General's staff and has discussed the 
, t Commission has not any formal position on this matter. 
The efore the comments I am ing today are mine and do not necessarily 
reflect our Commission's views. 
S. Ct. 1232 (1987) 
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In a nutshell I think First Lutheran and Nollan will impact most 
Californians because their local governments will be less able and willing to 
address the many and serious problems that beset our rapidly growing state. 
Smaller local governments will be particularly affected because they may not 
have either the legal or planning resources to take risks in the land use mine 
field that the Court has laid in these two cases. On the other hand the three 
cases taken together reaffirm the Fifth Amendment •taking• rules first 
established in 1922 by Justice Holmes. They do not help us identify what 
governmental action is a •taking•. Larger agencies will be able to better 
cope with the increased risk; they will also be better equipped to analyze the 
burdens of projects on the general public. 
First Lutheran sets aside the California rule that improper regulations 
should be invalidated rather than money damages awarded. So if a city or 
county faces a difficult problem of public health, safety or welfare and 
devises land use regulations to address the problem, it risks second guessing 
by the United States Supreme Court and, if its regulations are found wanting, 
payment of money damages. Now if we knew what governmental regulations went 
too far this remedy would not make a lot of difference since most agencies are 
only interested in solving society's problems in a legally sound manner. But 
even Justice Holmes could not inform us when a regulation goes too far. He 
said •[T]his is a question of degree and therefore cannot be disposed of by 
1 . . 4/ genera propos1t1ons.•- If the best legal minds in the country, which the 
Supreme Court should certainly represent, cannot tell ahead of time what goes 
too far, how will the planning director of weed Patch know? 
4/Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 u.s. 393, 415 (1922) 
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Nollan complicates current regulatory approaches that help assure that the 
public can get to and along the state's shorelines but the case leaves the 
regulatory door ajar enough so that with increased agency staff and very 
careful attention to the project's impacts on access we may be able to meet 
the tighter •nexus• requirement in most cases involving new shoreline 
development. But the decision puts the so-called •rationally based and in the 
general public interest test• in a cocked hat. 
Our Commission was granted land use authority under state law to prevent 
the unnecessary filling of San Francisco Bay and to increase public access to 
the Bay's shoreline. To accomplish these goals, a Commission permit is needed 
to place fill or otherwise develop the Bay or the near shoreline. Using this 
regulatory authority, I believe the Commission has been quite effective in 
achieving the Legislature's goals over the past two decades. Before 1965 
about 2,300 acres of the Bay were being filled each year. Now only about 15 
acres are filled annually--all for critical water-oriented needs. And even 
this ~mall loss of water area is being mitigated by opening diked areas so 
that each year the Bay has been getting a bit larger. 
When the Bay Commission was established in 1965, less than four miles of 
the shoreline were open to public access. Today over one hundred miles of 
the shore are open and improved with pathways, landscaping and other public 
facilities. Much of this access is provided in the many beautiful shoreline 
parks that have been developed by the visionary park agencies that we are 
fortunate to have in the Bay Area. But large amounts of public access has 
been made available in public and private shoreline developments through the 
Commission's regulatory program. 
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To meet its legislative mandat~/ for assuring that •maximum feasible 
public access to the shoreline• is provided as a part of shoreline projects, 
the Commission typically includes access conditions in its permits. These 
conditions usually require the developer to set aside a prescribed area, often 
along the entire shoreline of the project, for public access. The developer 
is also required to legally restrict this area for public use, improve the 
access area with pathways, benches and plants, maintain the access area, and 
remain legally responsible for damage or injuries in the public area. The 
approach we use has generally been well accepted by the developers and 
property owners in the Bay Area. It has made San Francisco Bay more 
attractive and useful to both the general public and private property owners. 
Arguably, it has also added value to many recent developments because the 
access encourages the public to go to, shop in and eat at the development. 
While I point with pride to the accomplishments of the Commission, I must 
caution you that this record was achieved in the 22 years prior to the First 
Lutheran and Nollan decisions. At this point there is some debate and 
considerable confusion as to whether the Commission can continue its record of 
success in protecting San Francisco Bay's resources and opening public access 
to this public treasure. 
5/ Section 66602 of the Government Code, in part, states: •The Legislature 
further finds and declares that ••• existing public access to the shoreline 
and waters of the San Francisco Bay is inadequate and that maximum feasible 
public access, consistent with a proposed project, should be provided.• 
Section 66632.4, in part, states: •within any portion or portions of the 
shoreline band ••• the commission may deny an application for a permit for a 
proposed project only on the grounds that the project fails to provide maximum 
feasible public access, consistent with the proposed project, to the bay and 
its shoreline.• 
ts ci izens? 
a f government deprives him of all 
s and, even for a rary period of time, the Court exempted from 
rule what it described as •normal delays in obtaining building 
, changes in zoning ordiances, variances, and the like• without 
describing what is 
ac vities generate normal de 
in a •normal delay• or what sorts of government 
as opposed to temporary takings. The Court 
then remanded the case to a lower court to figure out how to apply the new 
1 ru e on rary ta ings to the facts in this case. For court buffs 
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it is interesting to note that Justices Brennan and Marshall joined the 
majority while Justice O'Connor dissented in this decision. 
In the 5-4 Nollan decision, Justices Brennan and Marshall joined the 
dissenters while Justice O'Conner moved to the majority side. The majority 
restated the traditional two-pronged test that a land use regulation, 
including a dedication requirement, does not effect a taking if it (1) 
advances legitimate state interests and (2) does not deny an owner 
economically viable use of his land. It added the adjective, •substantial• to 
the legitimate state interest part of the test and suggested that close 
scrutiny will occur whenever physical property is at stake such as with a 
dedication requirement. It never reached the second part of the test because 
it found that requiring the Nollan's to provide an easement between the bluff 
and the mean high tide line did not substantially advance a legitimate state 
interest. While the court assumes that access along beaches is a legitimate 
state interest, it could find no rational connection between the impacts of 
the new, larger house and public use of the beach in front of the house. The 
Court states emphatically that there was no connection shown but gives no 
guidance as to what type of connection it is interested in seeing. 
so the Court has reaffirmed our authority to impose conditions on permits 
to achieve legitimate purposes, but found that the Coastal Commission had not 
adequately demonstrated that the expansion of a beach cottage generated 
impacts justifying a condition requiring the property owners to allow the 
public to walk on the beach in front of the cottage. The Court also 
rhetorically suggested a few conditions that it would find acceptable, each 
seemingly far more onerous to the property owner than the condition imposed by 
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the Coastal Commission. So we can impose conditions, but not in the way the 
Coastal Commission did. As Justice Stevens said in his dissent, the decision 
leaves land use planners •guessing about how the Court will react to the next 
case, and the one after that.• 
In Keystone Coal the Court considered a Pennsylvania ordinance requiring 
mine owners to leave some coal in place so that subsidence wouldn't occur. 
The ordinance was not dissimilar from the Pennsylvania Coal case where Justice 
Holmes created the whole concept of •inverse condemnation• by his finding that 
•the general rule at least is, that while property may be regulated to a 
certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a 
. .5/ tak1ng. -
Ironically, the current court found the Pennsylvania ordinance to pass 
constitutional muster while Justice Holmes found the 1922 version wanting. 
The importance of this recent decision to us today is that it clearly 
reaffirms the Court's traditional approach for determining how far a 
regulation can go before it constitutes a •taking.• It will continue to look 
at the character of the governmental action -- the •legitimate state 
interest". But it will look harder when land dedications are at stake. The 
Court will also look to the economic impact of the questioned regulation on 
the claimant. Generally, it has been fairly hard for claimants to satisfy the 
5/ Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 u.s. 393 (1922) p. 415 
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court about either issue. so while the risk to government and tbe general 
taxpayer is greater, particularly to Californians who have enjoyed judges much 
less willing to jeopardize the treasuries of our cities when the complicated 
matter of land use is involved and mistakes are made, we are in no different 
place concerning what constitutes at taking after First Lutheran and Nollan 
than we were before. Unfortunately that has been and continues to be a very 
uncertain and undefined place. Until the Supreme Court provides further 
guidance through future decisions on land use regulation cases, we can only 
speculate on the long-term impact of the First Lutheran and Nollan decisions. 
For the immediate, I believe the decisions will have four major impacts on 
government regulation of development. 
First, the cases will generate considerably more litigation challenging 
government land use permits. This litigation will be generated for a variety 
of reasons. Just as we in government are left with uncertainty about the 
limits of our authority to regulate land use, the private sector is left with 
equal uncertainty. To provide the Supreme Court with the opportunity to 
further clarify its views, I am certain there will be challenges to most every 
type of condition over the next few years~ Furthermore, since the Court has 
opened the door to monetary payments for temporary takings, I suspect that 
some attorneys are now going to be willing to take inverse condemnation cases 
on a speculative fee basis much like they handle liability cases. If my 
suspicions are correct, this will encourage legal challenges that would not 
otherwise be financially prudent for private property owners. For all of 
these reasons, one of the main impacts of the First Lutheran and Nollan 
decisions will be that a lot more private and public money will be spent on 
lawyers fees over the next several years. 
- 1 4 -
the decisions 11 be that government in general--and 
government particular--wil become far more cautious in its approach 
to land use regulation. s wil hu i California more than in many other 
states because of our rapid growth, our fiscal policy and our tradition of 
a lowi local government a w latitude in addressing the many urban and 
rural ems presented when great numbers of folks want to use the finite 
resour of our state. 
According to what I have read in the press, private property interests see 
his new caution as welcome way of stemming what they view as overzealous 
regulation. In contrast, environmental interests have characterized this 
iousness as having a •chilling affect• on environmental protection 
programs. However this change is perceived, there is little doubt that 
gove land use regulators ha nking and rethinking every 
on deve t 
At t s nt we do not know what access requirements will satisfy the 
rt. So we have to guess. And f we guess wrong, the Court has opened to 
remote poss bi ity that we may have to pay for our error. As I have noted, 
s 1 • ~1 is remote. But 
l enough to pay f ice 
elected officials who are finding it 
f re protection, repair their streets 
keep their p aygrounds open, may not be willing to expose their public 
to e the remote possibili of having to pay an inverse 
ion claim I suspect t loca officials who have been 
cal to land use anning restrictions will now become 
r icular voca in us i to justi their opposition to 
de vel approval condit ons. 
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The third major impact of the Court's decisions is that it will become far 
more expensive for government agencies to carry out their land use regulatory 
functions. In Nollan, the Supreme Court reaffirmed government's authority to 
impose a permit condition, but only if the condition will overcome an impact 
that is serious enough to justify denying the per•it. The Court also 
admonished us to make sure the specific condition relates directly to the 
specific impact. 
In land use regulation, we often deal with complex projects that have many 
types of adverse impacts. A project may generate traffic, be partially within 
an environmentally sensitive area, attract workers whose children will 
overcrowd schools and cause a host of other problems. In the past, based on 
our experience and observations, we accepted that development in general 
brought with it a variety of problems in general. Unfortunately, we can no 
longer rely on empirical data in our regulation of development because the 
court has now required that we document the cause and effect of these problems 
with analytical data, planning studies and other such information. Moreover, 
we must document each of the multiplicity of problems, demonstrate that the 
problem alone is serious enough to justify denying a project permit, and 
establish how a condition will directly address that particular problem. It 
will take enormous amounts of money to pay for all of the planning studies, 
legal support and permit analysis that will be needed to provide the record 
necessary to support permit conditions. 
It will also be necessary for government to better coordinate its capital 
spending with its planning and land use regulatory programs. In Nollan, the 
Court acknowledged that the Coastal Commission's plan for providing public 
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access along the beach was acceptable, but that the access easement should be 
gained through acquisition rather than through a permit condition. If we have 
to purchase public rights to reach public tidelands~ it is essential that the 
acquisition programs administered by the California Department of Parks and 
Recreation, the State Coastal Conservancy, local park districts and other 
public agencies be in full conformance with the planning goals of our 
Commission, the Coastal Commission, local governments and other planning and 
land use regulatory agencies. Achieving this coordination will take time, 
cost money, and may require additional Legislative direction. But this 
focused effort is needed if government is expected to address the impacts of 
private development that have in the past been handled through permit 
conditions. 
Finally, although these decisions have been hailed by developers and 
private property owners, I believe that the decisions will cause as many 
problems for the private sector as they will for public agencies. The 
litigation that will be stimulated by these decisions will be initiated and 
paid fo by private interests. The salaries of the public attorneys and 
p anners who will be needed to defend the lawsuits and prepare analytical data 
to justi permit conditions will be paid with taxpayer dollars. Formulating 
conditions and documenting the need for the conditions will take time and 
de the issuance of permits. And most importantly, the decisions will 
generate additional tension and frustration between development proponents and 
the general public. 
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Throughout California we are seeing ever greater numbers of of citizen 
initiatives being passed to stop or slow growth. Despite planners' best 
efforts to deal with the complex problems brought about by growth, the general 
public has become increasingly dissatisfied with the planners' solutions. Up 
until recently, land use regulators had considerable flexibility to deal with 
these complex problems. The adverse environmental impacts of a project could 
be weighed against the benefits provided by a van pool program sponsored by 
the project developer. It appears that in the Nollan decision the Supreme 
Court has deprived government of considerable flexibility to come up with 
creative, economical and politically acceptable solutions to complex 
problems. Each impact of each project will have to be addressed in 
isolation. If government chooses to impose the sort of onerous conditions the 
Court suggested would have been appropriate for the Nollan house permit, the 
applicant will be dissatisfied. If government chooses to conclude that the 
problem, by itself, does not justify imposing a condition, the general public 
will become further dissatisfied as the cumulative impacts of development 
problems become apparent. Instead of formulating effective solutions, 
government will have to choose between ignoring problems and imposing 
unacceptable and possibly unworkable conditions. The inevitable result of 
this situation will be even more popular dissatisfaction with government 
efforts to responsibly manage growth and more citizens efforts to stop growth 
entirely. 
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land use, the Nollan and First English decisions explicitly recognize 
government's authority to regulate the use of land, even to the extent of 
denial of the use of a substantial part of an individual's property. 
The Supreme Court, in Nollan, invalidated a Coastal Commission permit 
decision which required the dedication, as a condition of permit issuance, of 
a strip of land for lateral access along the beach. The Court clarified the 
level of justification that government must provide when it requires the 
dedication for public use of part of an owner's interest in property as a 
condi on of development. It held that the standard of review that will be 
appli to determine whether such regulation will pass constitutional muster 
is whether it substantially advances a legitimate state interest. The Court 
indicated that to meet the nsubstantial advancement 11 test, an agency must show 
that the development which it seeks to regulate would cause (either 
individually or cumulatively) the impact which the condition is designed to 
alleviate. and, conversely, that the condition directly responds to that 
impact of the development. That standard may be contrasted with the "rational 
basis" test that has previously been applied by the courts in reviewing 
regulatory actions of the Commission and other governmental agencies. 
Agencies were previously required only to demonstrate a rational relationship 
between the project's impacts and the condition imposed. In effect, the Court 
held that the Commission was improperly mixing apples and oranges by allowing 
a negotiative type of trade-off between impacts and unrelated conditions. The 
Senate Committee on 
Loca 1 Government 
Augu 13, 
- 170 -
Court 1 S new test. whi e changing standard of review of decisions in 
California, will not generally require a drastic change in governmental land 
use planning and regulatory practices. 
Similarly, First English makes a real change in the law to be applied in 
California, but one which is limited in scope. Properly viewed, it is a 
remedies case. Prior to this decision, California agencies were, in effect, 
permitted to 11 Cure" regulatory decisions subsequently found to be improper 
takings. because the courts required only that regulatory action later 
determined to be invalid be repealed or revised. The Court has now said that 
financial compensation is required even when the taking is not permanent. 
Thus. the holding requires. as a matter of federal 
canst iona law. government now assume a financial risk when its land 
use regul on is s ly to a ing. Left entirely unaffected 
by is decision, contra to many of press reports following upon it, is 
the to be appli in rmining whether a taking has in fact 
occu change in law. very real, is not very broad. 
Unless one is willing to. as one expert put it. 11 read tea leaves", this is 
the limit of these two decisions. Although some might find language in these 
decisions which hints at future change, the actual holding of a Court decision 
is determined by examining the standards prescribed in relation to the facts 
recited in that decision. Lawyers and legal philosophers may spend many hours 
Senate Committee on 
Local Government 
August 13, 1987 
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debating, for example, esoteric applications of the standard of judicial 
review under the "substantial advancement" versus the "rational basis" test. 
The widespread speculation as to how the Court in future cases might answer 
those questions here left unanswered is exactly t~at. 
As this debate continues the Coastal Commission will face the practical 
challenge of implementing the directives of the Nollan decision. Consistent 
with my reading of the Court's ruling in Nollan. I will advise the Commission 
that its permit decisions will be closely scrutinized. The decision 
re-emphasizes what government agencies have known since the Topanga decision: 
that agency findings must explain the agency's action. Findings must detail 
the agency's analytical process and explain why the agency reached the 
conclusion to which it came. Nollan reminds us that the Commission must 
detail in its findings the impacts of a particular project and explain how 
those impacts caused by the project can be mitigated by the specific 
conditions imposed. If the Commission finds that a project's impact is not 
consistent with Coastal Act policies, and yet cannot devise conditions which 
t gate that impact, or explain exactly how these effects can be mitigated by 
conditions. it may be compelled by Nollan to deny permits which it has been 
its past practice to approve. This result is clearly contemplated by the 
Court in the Nollan decision. 
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In closing, I wou 1 ssion 1 s imposition of 
access conditions has to date been routinely upheld by the California 
1 cou Access a1 the shoreline is a state policy rooted 
in Constitution and mandated by the access policies of the Coastal Act. 
The Commission has implemented that access mandate in a manner which it 
believed was fully consistent with both the state and federal constitutions, 
as well as the Coastal Act. noted, California courts have routinely held 
that the Commission has appropriately exercised the authority granted to it in 
the stal Act by the Legislature. Now that the Supreme Court has indicated 
that the federal constitution res a different analysis, the Commission 
11 disc rge its access mandate accordingly. 
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REGULATION OF LAND USE 
AFTER THE RECENT 
SUPREME COURT CASES 
• First English Evangelical Lutheran Church 
v. County of Los Angeles 
• Nollan v. California Coastal Commission 
In June, the United States Supreme Court issued two major deci-
sions concerning the regulation of land use by local governments: 
• In First English, the Court said property owners are entitled to 
some compensation if their property has been "taken" by govern-
ment regulation. 
• In Nollan, the Court determined that a particular regulation 
requiring dedication of public access was in fact a taking because 
there was no relationship between the dedication and the project. 
When first issued, these decisions were hailed by some as heralding a revolu-
tion in city and county land use planning and regulation. The two cases were seen 
by those observers as the most significant court decisions on private property 
rights since the early pan of the century. 
As land use decisionmakers, planners, and public attorneys have studied the 
opinions, however, a different view has emerged: neither Supreme Court decision 
alters government's fundamental power to regulate land use, and neither changes 
the basic rules defining when a land use regulation "goes too far" and violates the 
United States Constitution. 
continued on nu:t page 
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is 
l/, a six-to-three vote of the Court decided 
have been over for several 
Court said that now, when a regulation 
that it crosses the constitutional line and 
becomes a the landowner has a to cornpt!ns.aticm 
for damages to the property the time the 
regulation was in effect Previously, the solution was to direct 
a local government to adopt a new regulation. 
Contrary to press reports about the case, the Court 
did not redefine where that constitutional line is; the Court did 
not hold that temporary ordinances or moratoria constitute a 
and, the Court did not hold that landowners must be 
allowed to develop their land for its most profitable use. The 
decision leaves intact the traditional rule -- regulations 
that deny a owner all economic use and fail to 
advance clear public objectives will be overturned. 
Nollan: Development and the Dedication 
Must be 
In Nollo.n the Supreme Court tested the California 
Coastal Commission's requirement that a beachfront property 
owner allow the to use a portion of the beach for public 
access a<> a condition for his house. On a close five-
to- four vote, the Court reaffirmed a limit on 
cities and counties which that conditions 
on any development be to alleviate the 
created that 
The Court struck down the Coastal 
Commission's dedication because the Court could 
not find any connection between the and the 
to the created by the Nollans' house. In doing 
the Court restated broad 
land for a purposes -- even 
when such reduce the value 
property. 
These two recent Supreme Court decisions both deal with 
" Governmental power to the 
and welfare (usually and 
often and courts are called 
upon to who wins. When courts side with the 
property owner, find that a 
has occurred. While such decisions are very rare, the 
concept taking the limits govern-
ments can and is therefore of great importance to public 
decisionmakers and to professionals in the field of land use 
planning. 
State, federal and local governments have the power 
through the exercise of "eminent domain" to take privately 
owned property for the use or benefit of the public. When the 
government exercises this power, it is constitutionally required 
to pay the property owner "just compensation" for the property 
taken.3/ For example, when government wants to acquire land 
for parks or it must initiate condemnation proceed-
ings to obtain title to the property in return for payment of the 
fair market value. 
In contrast to a direct condemnation, an "inverse condemna-
tion" may result when the government appropriates an interest in 
private property, or destroys or physically damages private 
property, without formally condemning the property and paying 
the property owner. Such governmental action is referred to as a 
"taking" of the property without just compensation. The 
property owner is entitled to damages in the amount of the fair 
market value of the property taken. 
Neither decision alters government's fundamental 
power to regulate land use, and neither changes the 
basic rules defining when a regulation goes "too far" 
Sometimes the taking is a physical invasion of property due 
to governmental action, such as inadvertent flooding from a 
nearby dam. a regulatory taking occurs if govern-
ment oversteps its power to zone or plan. 
Generally, government enacts such regulations to protect the 
public health, safety, and welfare. Land use controls and zoning 
ordinances which further these broad "police power" goals are 
presumed to be valid. Even land use regulations which drasti-
cally limit the activities that a private property owner can 
conduct on property, and substantially reduce the market value 
of the property, are usually not seen to be takings.4/ 
For family zoning may make a of 
land worth less than a quarter of what it would be worth if an 
apartment or a shopping center were allowed. Yet the single 
family zone does not constitute a taking. In fact, courts have 
upheld the of ordinances that reduce the value of 
private property by as much as 90 percentS/ 
Nonetheless, if a regulation "goes too far," it may become a 
regulatory taking.6/ The courts decide if a regulation amounts to 
a such taking on a case-by-case basis by looking at the following 
tests: 
A taking has occurred if a regulation does not substan-
advance legitimate public interests and deprives 
a property owner of substantially all of the market 
value or use of his land. 7/ In this test, courts give wide 
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discretion to cities and counties to make judgments about 
what regulations are necessary. 
A taking occurs if the regulation interferes with ''rea-
sonable investment- backed expectations"- a concept 
put forward by the United States Supreme Court but 
defined in relatively few cases. In fact, courts have been 
better at defming what does not constitute such expecta-
tions; for example, a landowner is not justified in expect-
ing that the zoning on property will remain constant, and 
is not protected from changes in zoning laws. 
A taking may occur when the regulation results in a 
permanent physical occupation of private property.8/ A 
physical occupation of property will, nonetheless, not be 
a taking if the physical occupation is a legitimate condi-
tion to a development permit - such as a requirement 
that a certain portion of a housing tract be dedicated to 
public park use. This is the test discussed in the Noll an 
case. 
But despite much discussion in governmental and legal 
circles, the fact remains that only in extremely rare situations do 
courts find that zoning ordinances or other planning regulations 
actually step over the constitutional line and create a taking of 
private property. 
FIRST ENGLISH : 
What a Lando\\11er Gets When a "Regulatory 
Taking" Has Occurred -The Rule Changes 
What happens if a court determines that a state law or local 
ordinance fails these tests and that a regulatory taking of private 
property has occurred? Is the offensive ordinance simply invali-
dated, or must the government in addition pay damages to the 
property owner? 
At least in California prior to First English, the only remedy 
available to a landowner for a regulatory taking was the invalida-
tion of the unconstitutional regulation. Local government was 
not required to pay monetary compensation to the property 
owner.9/ In reaching this conclusion, the California Supreme 
Court weighed the benefits of compensating property owners 
against the chilling effect that rule could have on enactment of 
necessary measures to protect the public health, safety and 
welfare. 
In First English, the Supreme Court changed this "no 
damages" rule. The First English case involved church property 
in a canyon that was subject to flooding. After a severe flood 
killed several persons and destroyed the buildings on the 
property, the County of Los Angeles enacted an interim ordi-
nance creating a flood protection area and prohibiting rebuilding 
any structures there. The church sued the county, alleging that 
the regulation was a taking of its property. It did not request 
invalidation of the ordinance, but asked only that the Court 
award it damages. 
The Court held that, when a land use regulation is a 
taking in violation of the constitution, the property owner is 
entitled to damages occurring from the time the unconstitu-
tional ordinance is applied to his property until it is withdrawn 
by the public agency which enacted it 10/ If the agency 
chooses to keep the ordinance in effect, it has the option to use 
its power of eminent domain, pay the owner fair market value 
and acquire the property. 
What the First English Case Did Not Say 
The Court did not add any new law to the question of 
whether an ordinance constitutes a taking. The lower courts 
and the Supreme Court did not decide whether the flood 
protection ordinance destroyed the use or value of the property 
and did not decide whether it was a valid safety measure. The 
California courts, and therefore the Supreme Court, were 
concerned solely with the question of whether money dam-
ages would be available to the property owner if it were 
ultimately determined in a trial that a taking had occurred. Ill 
Ironically, it is unlikely that the Los Angeles ordinance is a 
taking under established law which is especially deferential to 
city and county ordinances enacted to protect life and safety. 
A second misunderstanding 'about First English relates to 
the Court's use of the word "temporary." Some have taken the 
Court's opinion to mean that moratoria or interim ordinances 
constitute regulatory takings just because they are temporary 
prohibitions. While it so happened that the Los Angeles ordi-
nance challenged in this case was a temporary ordinance, the 
Court's opinion would apply to any ordinance that violated the 
Constitution. In fact, temporary ordinances are not likely to 
violate the Constitution because they usually have a small 
effect on market value. 
IN SUM: If --and only if-- a taking by regulation can 
be proven, a landowner can now claim compensation/or any 
value lost during the time the regulation affected his or her 
property. 
NOLI.AN: 
The Supreme Court Decides That One Required 
Dedication Flunks the Constitutional Test 
In Nollan, the Supreme Court looked at the constitutional-
ity of one type of governmental regulation, namely, dedica-
tions of real property attached as conditions to development 
permits designed to lessen the adverse impacts of develop-
3 
diminish the 
open to the 
These view 
take care of the increased 
need for 
view of the beach and 
coastline which 
To offset these the Commission 
Nollans to an easement to the public, consisting of a 
narrow of their oceanfront in between two adjoining 
beaches. The Nollans that the 
condition was a 
a five- to- four vote, the United States Court 
found that the condition constituted a permanent 
invasion of the Nollans' rights which would 
unless the condition "substantially ad-
vanced" a governmental interest." The Court 
concluded that the de.dication didn 'l pass this test. 
barriers to beach access, or 
beaches so the denial 
11"'',.,''"" the owner of all eccmomi(::3ll 
Court even Pnr!rW<CPti 
do address the burden created 
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the The Court stated that the Commission 
could dedication of a viewing area on the 
Nollans' property as a condition of permit approval since such a 
area would substantially advance a legitimate govern-
mental interest in the view of the beach and ocean 
which be wholly or partially blocked by the Nollans' 
home. 
It is unclear whether the Nollan test applies to any condi-
tions other than dedications of real property. The reasoning of 
the Court appears limited to appropriations of real 
property which eliminate the owner's right to exclude others. 
The opinion may not apply to requirements for in lieu fees or 
other exactions, such as payment for or construction of capital 
The test for such monetary exactions may 
remain as before Nollan. The remedy in the event such 
monetary exactions are judged irrational appears to remain 
invalidation. 
IN SUM: Exactions on development must address a 
problem created or contributed to by the development, or the 
cumulative effects of development. The dedication in Nollan 
failed the test because the Court could find no connection 
between the problem -- a large house blocking the public's 
views to the beach from the inland -- and the condition-- al-
lowing the public already on the beach to walk in front of the 
lwuse. 
Questions and Answers About 
ordinance that made someone 's property into 
a park -- that that required the property owner to 
admit the public, without charge, to his or her property for rec-
reational use.l4/ 
Q. If a town enacts an emergency interim ordinance 
certain uses of property, to protect against 
an immediate threat to the public health and safety, 
such as flood danger or other hazards, is that a taking 
of property? 
A. No. As discussed above, the interim nature of an 
ordinance does not lead to the conclusion that a taking has 
occurred. More irnJX)rtant, actions taken to protect the public 
health and safety -- rather than the public "welfare" concerns 
(such a<> density of housing) -- may be much more harsh if nec-
essary to protect life and property. A ftre department, for 
example, may in an emergency destroy a house to prevent the 
spread of the frre without paying for it. This stems from the 
legal concept that one may not use one's property in a manner 
that poses danger to life or property. IS/ 
Q. If a local government enacts a temporary morato-
rium ordinance prohibiting the issuance of building 
permits to maintain the status quo for a reasonable 
period (for example, two years) and to enable the city 
or county to proceed with planning to address con-
cerns about the impacts of increased development, is 
that a taking of private property rights? 
A. No. First English did not single out temporary 
moratoria for special treatment. The usual takings tests apply, 
and it is unlikely that a temporary moratorium undertaken for 
planning purposes would meet the requirements for a taking.l6/ 
Although a moratorium could temporarily depress property 
prices, such fluctuations usually fall far short of destroying 
"substantially all" the market value of property and are constitu-
tionally permissible. 
Q. If a local government enacts a slow-growth 
ordinance limiting the number of building permits to 
be issued per year, is that a taking of private property 
righl<;? 
A. NOl unless the "slow growth" ordinance is so restric-
tive as to constitute essentially "no growth." If an ordinance 
were so restrictive that a landowner could demonstrate that the 
period for development was so long that the property 
had been deprived of substantially all its value, a taking could 
be established. Even if residential or commercial development 
were permanenlly but the property could be used for 
a beneficial use such as agriculture, a taking would not have 
occurred. 
local government enacts an ordinance halting 
development until a certain service level (such as sewer 
capacity, schoolroom capacity, street improvements) is 
is that a taking? 
A. Such ordinances should be carefully drafted and 
enacted only after thorough study. As long as there is a 
that development will be permitted in the short-term 
and that the designated level of service goals are reason-
able, the ordinance will survive a takings attack. A connection 
must also exist between the halted development and the stated 
community problem (e.g., traffic). In constrasl, a development 
moratorium of indefinite duration attached to goals for commu-
nity service levels that are obviously unlikely to be attained 
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could constitute a taking. 
Q. If the voters of a community pass an initiative 
measure to temporarily halt development in their 
area, is that a taking? 
A. The fact that an ordinance is passed by initiative does 
not change the applicable constitutional standard. As discussed 
above, a temporary halt on development is unlikely to ever be a 
taking because it usually has only a small effect on market 
values. 
Q. Is a down-zoning of land -such as from rural 
residential to exclusive agricultural, or from intensive 
residential to less intensive residential, or from com-
mercial to residential uses - a taking? 
A. Changing the zoning designation of a parcel does not 
become a taking simply because the designation is for a less 
intensive use. In order to constitute a taking, the new zone 
would have to be so restrictive as to violate one of the tests 
discussed above, including depriving the land of substantially 
all its value 17/. 
What Are the Implications ofFirst English? 
· Q. Does First English increase the likelihood that a 
land use regulation would be found to be a taking? 
A. No. The case does not discuss the criteria for how to 
analyze whether a taking has occurred. It does not change the 
test for the validity of a regulation. In particular, California 
law holding that temporary interim regulations and downzon-
ings are not takings is unaffected by the decision. 
Q. Does First English mean that a local government 
must zone real property to allow the use potentially 
most profitable to the owner? 
A. No. The test for a regulatory taking is still whether 
the governmental action deprives the owner of substantially all 
reasonable use of the property, or substantially all economic 
value. Unless there is a physical invasion, any regulation that 
leaves the owner some reasonable use or economic value will 
be upheld. The First English decision does not address this 
traditional test or change it in any way. 
continued 
5 
.,...,~""'·•·h, owner can 
prove in court that the him or her of 
all rea<>onable use of the In practice, it is 
that there will be some ca..es. statutes of limi-
uu,:,.:u•<.:> to bring their claims to court 
within a certain of time after they learn have a 
may limit the amount of over regula-
tions. The more issue lies in the as land-
owners consider whether to new or 
conditions. 
'-'<"''"""""" might be calculated according to 
For 
interim in condemnation often 
focus on the rental value of the interest taken for the 
of time in which it was The applica-
tion of these to will have to 
over time and may involve proce-
to be used to determine any damage awards. 
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Does Nollan affect the validity of governmental re-
other than the dedication of real property, 
such as the of in lieu fees or the provisions of 
fadlities?18/ 
A. Nollan may not apply to exactions other than those 
dedications of real property. If Nollan were to apply, 
an in lieu fee would be constitutional as long as it relates to a 
problem caused by the development and is in reasonable propor-
tion to the of the development In California, it is always 
advisable that fees which address community-wide problems be 
supported by documentation which connects the development 
project to those problems.l9/ 
Q. Did Nollan change the law of takings? 
A. Not significantly. As a result of First English , govern-
ment must compensate a landowner for a regulation or exaction 
which "goes too far" for any damages to the property for the 
period of time that the regulation affected the property. Nollan 
applied the takings rule in a specific instance involving the 
dedication of real property. Under Nollan, when there is no 
clear connection between the public burdens imposed by a 
particular land use approval and the required dedication of real 
property, there may be a taking. Under First English, cities and 
counties would then be required to compensate the landowner 
for the damage to the property for the period of time that the 
dedication was actually in effect 
Q. wm the following types of dedications be valid 
after Nollan? 
... Roads in a subdivision? 
A. Yes. Land dedications for such uses as roads, side-
and schools should easily satisfy the requirement that 
address a burden created or contributed to by the develop-
ment 
""''""·Mnmf'nl to ••• Public 
Yes. Park dedications inside a subdivision should 
pass the Dedication of park lands 
or at some other location would be supportable as 
as they are reasonably in proportion to the needs generated 
the effects of the In lieu fee contributions are 
discussed in a question above. 
easements? 
A. Yes. The Nollan court specifically mentioned the pos-
of conditioning development approvals on the creation 
of a public viewing area on private property in order to protect 
the view. The court indicated that such a requirement 
would be valid even it involved a conveyance of an 
-- if it offset the obstruction of the view 
the development. 
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... Open space easements which prevent development on 
portions of private property? 
A. Yes. Dedications for either passive or active open 
space uses would survive the Nollan test as long as they meet 
open space needs created individually or cumulatively by the 
development To the extent development would damage or 
destroy open space resources such as creeks, unique vegetation 
or wildlife habitat, dedications should be upheld if the owner is 
allowed a reasonable use elsewhere on the property or is able to 
transfer development rights. Likewise, where dedications are 
required to allow development on hazardous areas such as 
unstable slopes, areas prone to slide or earthquake faults, they 
should be sustained if the owner is otherwise allowed a reason-
able use. 
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1. First English Evangelical Lwheran Church v. County of Los 
Angeles 107 S .Ct. 2378 (1987). 
2. Nollan v. Coastal Commission 55 U.S.L.W. 5145 (June 26, 1987). 
3. United States Constitution, 5th Amendment. California Constitution, 
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4. See, e.g., Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); HFH, Lld. 
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(1982). 
9. Agins v. City ofTiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266 (1979). See Agins v. City of 
Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980). 
10. The Court explicitly refrained from "resolv[ing] the takings claim on 
the merits." 107 S.Ct. at 2384. It "ha(d] no occasion to decide whether 
the ordinance at issue actually denied appellant all use of its property" or 
not. Id. 
11. The Court did not explicitly state when the "taking" would begin. 
For example, where a procedure for receiving a permit is provided, a 
property owner would have to go through that process and be turned 
down before a taking could have occurred. Williamson County Regional 
Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172 
(1985). 
12. The Commission also found that the larger residence would increase 
private use of the beach, contributing to the public beach users' impres-
Q. Does Nollan affect the validity of assessment 
districts created for funding improvements such as 
nood control, drainage, or roads? 
A. No. Again, No/ian may apply only to dedications of 
interests in real property. Even if Nol/an were to apply to 
assessments or other fees in connection with districts, there is 
usually a very close connection required between the burdens 
imposed by the new development and the creation of an as-
sessment district to pay for necessary improvements. 
sion that they had no right to use the strip of beach and tidelands seaward 
of the private property line. Increasing the size of the house could also 
create congestion on the public beaches. In addition, the Commission 
found that increased private use of the beach might fuel disputes between 
the public and the private owners over the boundary line. However, the 
Court's opinion does not focus on these fmdings. 
13. Specifically, the Nollans argued that the dedication required them to 
give up the right to exclude others from the property, and that the 
condition could not be justified since the new home would do nothing to 
interfere with public access. 
14. Zoning for commercial recreation areas is valid, however. Activities 
such as amusement parks, golf courses, tennis clubs, etc. may or may not 
be open to the public at the discretion of the owner, give land substantial 
economic value, and are not a taking. See Freedman v. Fairfax, 81 Cal. 
App. 3d 667 (1978). 
15. See, e.g., Turner v. County of Del Norte, 24 Cal. App. 3d 311 (1972) 
(zoning restrictions that protect people and property from flooding are a 
proper exercise of the police power). 
16. An interim measure restricting or halting construction pending 
further land ~se planning is not a taking. State v. Superior Court, 12 Cal. 
3d 237, 254-55 (1974); CEEED v. California Coastal Zone Conservation 
Commission, 43 Cal. App. 3d 306,314 (1974). 
17. See for example, Joyce v. City of Portland 546 P.2d 1100 (Ct. App. 
Or. 1976) where 800 acres were downzoned from agricultural to 
residential; and Gisler v. County of Madera, 38 Cal. App. 3d 303, 112 
Cal. Rptr. 919 (1974), where exclusive agricultural zoning was held not 
to be a tak.ing. 
18. For example, a local government may require developers to pay fees 
for school facilities as a condition of development of residential subdivi-
sion (see Candid Emerprises, Inc. v. Grossmon.J Union High School Dist., 
39 Cal. 3d 878 (1985)) or to pay special assessment for public improve-
ments necessitated by new development (see J.W. Jones Companies v. 
Ci.Jy of San Diego, 157 Cal. App. 3d 745 (1984)). 
19. Fees wruch fail that test could be held to be a special tax under 
Proposition 13 and related law. 
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August 13, 1987 
Madame Chairman and members of the Senate Local Government Committee, I 
am Larry Mintier of Mintier & Associates, Planning Consultants. I am here 
representing the California Chapter of the American Planning Association. 
My comments principally concern the possible impacts popular perceptions of 
the First English and Nollan decisions will have on local planning and land 
use regulatory programs. 
Based on my reading of the two decisions and numerous commentaries on the 
cases, it seems there is more smoke than fire in these two court decisions. 
But just as the smoke from a fire is more often fatal than the fire itself, the 
popular perception (or misperception) of these two decisions will have a 
greater impact on local planning and land use regulation than will the 
decisions themselves. 
In a strictly legal sense, these two decisions do not appear to change the 
basic rules of local land use planning and regulation. The First English 
decision told us only the remedy for a taking; it did not redefine what 
constitutes a 
already knew, or 
must advance a 
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us little more than what we 
known--namely, that development conditions 
public interest and logically relate to the identified 
Again, in a strictly legal sense, nothing seems to have changed. Still, as 
before these decisions were handed down, governments can plan, zone (even 
down zone) , control growth, abate nuisances, impose conditions on 
development approvals, and enact moratoria. To the extent that local 
planning and regulatory practices were in compliance with constitutional, 
statutory, and case law prior to these two decisions, no changes should be 
necessary as a consequence decisions. 
Had these decisions not been so sensationally reported and misinterpreted by 
the press, local governments have felt less compelled to change the 
problem is that the decisions were 
were misreported the early days 
announcement of these two decisions, local 
governments all over California began receiving letters and telephone calls 
property owners, developers, and attorneys citing First English and 
~=;;.:;; and 
local plans and regulations 
their projects were not approved or if 
their property interests were not 
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changed. As lay people, property owners can be excused for misunderstand-
ing what the Supreme Court said in these two cases. The attorneys know 
better--or at least should. 
One of my client cities just completing a comprehensive general plan 
revision received a letter in early July in which an attorney representing a 
major property interest in the community cited both First English and Nollan 
in support of his claim that his client had not received fair treatment and 
had experienced major delays in the city's 2-1/2 year-long general plan 
revision process. He concluded that the city's general plan process had 
"severely compromised [his] client's development rights" and that "such 
extraordinary delays require monetary compensation because they represent a 
clear taking of private property". He went on to say that "[a]s the two 
recent U.S. Supreme Court cases regarding land use point out, public 
actions, such as scenic ridgeline [policies], can be justified only when the 
public pays for the development rights, which are restricted by such 
policies." Incidentally, the subject property is outside the city limits. 
Most cities and counties in California have probably received similar letters 
in the past two months. 
Without a doubt, the popular perception of the First English and Nollan 
decisions has had and will continue to have a major impact on local planning 
and land use regulation. Already, one northern California court has 
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required a city planning commission to make additional findings based on the 
;;;..,...;;;..;;;;;;.;;.;.= decision supporting development conditions it had imposed on a 
project. 
The Board of Supervisors of one California county in the final stages of a 
comprehensive general plan revision recently authorized a $100,000 
supplemental general plan budget allocation for additional legal review of 
their draft general plan and for economic analysis of takings claims based on 
the First English and N ollan decisions . 
Local officials are understandably nervous abqut the possibility that they 
may have to pay compensation for takings. The costs could be enormous 
and the impact on the local budgets disastrous. Local officials are probably 
as concerned about the cost of the litigation. itself. Win or lose, 
lawsuits are expensive for local governments. The City of Santa Cruz spent 
a half million dollars defending its 1979 Measure 0 greenbelt initiative 
court against a takings claim. The city won, but at a staggering 
cost to the city treasury. 
of the lawsuits that will inevitably be filed based on the 
First English and Nollan decisions, local officials may be confronted with the 
of defending themselves in cases where they may prevail if they 
enough money or watering down regulations or making concessions to 
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property owners and developers who threaten litigation. This is a 
"lose-lose" proposition for both local governments and the citizens they 
represent. 
Out of fear of litigation, local governments may respond in several ways: 
1. Local governments will probably spend more time and money having 
their attorneys review. land use plans and regulations before adoption to 
ensure compliance with constitutional and statutory requirements. 
2. Elected officials, planning commissioners, local planners, and public 
agency attorneys will probably spend more time drafting findings and 
preparing documentation to support the conditions they impose on 
development approvals. 
3. Local officials may not enact useful and needed land use regulations 
even where the community wants them and the local government has 
solid legal grounds for doing so. 
4. Local governments may make greater concessions to property owners 
and developers in the development review and approval process. In 
some of these cases, local governments may assume a larger share of 
the responsibility for financing public services and improvements or 
simply settle for a lower level of service. 
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5. In some areas, local governments may substitute incentive programs for 
regulatory measures to secure needed or desirable services and 
facilities. For instance, a local government might grant a density 
bonus to residential projects that include child care facilities in lieu of 
requiring the developer to construct such facilities or to make an equivalent 
financial contribution. Local governments may also rely more on density 
techniques such as clustering and transfer of development rights. 
While there are likely to be some positive results of the First English and 
Nollan decisions in terms of improving and tightening up the local land use 
planning and regulatory process, local governments will waste a tremendous 
amount of the agencies' time and the public's money defending themselves in 
court and trying to avoid litigation based on these two decisions. 
In the First English and Nollan decisions, it is the smoke, not the fire, that 
we need to be concerned about. 
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